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Abstract   
This thesis investigates what are the characteristics of resilience within the energy 
sector, as well as what are the "best” known practices being used to increase 
awareness of the employees. By looking at the existing literature and finding 
differences between how the energy sector in Norway vs other nations approaches 
resilience. There is a difference in Norway's more decentralized power grid, where 
many smaller power stations supply energy, compared to other nation with single 
large power station. This influences how they will approach resilience. 
The study uses a qualitative research approach, with semi-structured interviews to 
gather data from several organizations within the energy sector of Norway.  
The results are then analyzed, and compared to existing research, to achieve a 
theoretical understanding of the result.  
The study identifies what are the characteristics that can be used to define resilience 
within the energy sector. And defines how these characteristics can be used to 
achieve resilience within an organization. Furniture more this study analyzes what 
constitutes “Best-practices” and if they truly are “best,” before investigating how such 
practices are used to increase awareness of resilience to the employee of the energy 
sector. To achieve this, we create a list of questions through semi-structured 
interviews, which are based on our hypothesis, and what was discovered in the 
literature. To potentially discover what are the best practices used, what resilience is 
in the energy sector, and how resilience can be achieved in this area.   
The findings of this study shows that the understanding and awareness of resilience 
in Norwegian energy sector share some similarities with existing literature, but the 
process and how they achieve it is different. One of the more known and often 
referred framework such as The National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST), 
is vastly limited in Norway, and they have had the need to make their own version of 
frameworks. 
The road ahead for this paper would be to have a more extensive study with an 
increased number of organizations and different stakeholders about resilience and 
the awareness of it. A quantitative study that investigates resilience within the energy 
sector could provide a more generalizable result to further the understanding of 
resilience within the critical infrastructure in Norway.  
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CIS Critical Infrastructure Systems 
DSB Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og 
beredskap 
(Directorate of Civil Protection and 
Emergency Planning) 
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CIPSEC Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection 
with Innovative Security Framework 
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NAS National Academies of Sciences 
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Directorate) 
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NIST National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
HRO Highly Reliable Organizations 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CISR R&D National Critical Infrastructure Security and 
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ISO International Organization for 
Standardization 
DLP Data Loss Prevention 
SIEM Security Information and Event Management 
ICS Industrial Control Systems 
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Threats 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition 
KBF Kraft Beredskapsforskriften 
(Power preparedness regulation) 
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1.0 Introduction  
The society we live in is becoming more dependent on critical infrastructure services. 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) refers to these services as the framework of interdependent 
networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including 
people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of 
products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United 
States, the smooth functioning of governments at all levels, and society as a whole”. 
The dependence of these services is both on the technology used in the infrastructure 
and on the organization that manages these infrastructures. These infrastructures 
manage to provide significant social and economic benefits that modern society is 
dependent on being available, reliable, safe, and secure. Nickolov Eugene. (2005). 
So, any disruptions caused to the infrastructures could have a significant impact on 
all aspect of modern society such as proper functioning of government and 
industries, losing essential services to the community, operating ability of business 
will be reduced, and other adverse effect, which makes the importance of CIS crucial 
and must be functioning ag least at minimal level for survival of society. (Nickolov 
2005). With several recent attacks on the energy sector, such as the Indian nuclear 
power plant in 2019, where a malware infected the network (Thomas, 2019). In 
addition, the U.S. Pipeline shutdown in the early year of 2021, where a ransomware 
attacked caused disruption to a large part of the east coast of USA (Eaton et al. 2021). 
These recent attacks show the impact an attack on critical infrastructure can have. To 
reduce the impact and frequency of threats and attacks against critical infrastructure, 
an increased attention is being directed at improving the resilience of critical 
infrastructure. (Brown et al. 2017). What is resilience and how can it be used to 
increase the resilience of an organization. In modern times the term resilience can 
have a variety of meanings, depending on context it can be about people, diseases, 
nature, cyber, structure etc. However, the concept generalized in the context of crisis 
and disaster management in the mid 2000’s. When used it is important to specify in 
which area the term will be used, in this thesis we will look at resilience in a specific 
area of critical infrastructure in Norway.  
The topic will look at what the energy sector does to achieve a resilient system, and 
what has been settled on to train the employee to have more understanding of 
security and how well the training works.  
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By using qualitative interviews this thesis will investigate what defines resilience in 
the energy sector, and how employees can become aware of their own role, to 
increase the overall resilience in their organization. Since frameworks and different 
practices have an essential role in how security and resilience are implemented, we 
will investigate what these frameworks have and what are the best practices to use to 
achieve resilience. This study looks at 7 organizations within the energy sector of 
Norway, and from these organizations we have interviewed 11 employees to discover 
what is true about the existing literature, and what has differed from the energy 
sector in Norway.  
1.1 Energy sector  
James Chen (2020, p1) states in his article that “The energy sector is a large and all-
encompassing term that describes a complex and interrelated network of 
companies, directly and indirectly, involved in the production and distribution of 
energy needed to power the economy and facilitate the means of production and 
transportation.” The objectives of the energy sector are to produce an uninterrupted 
supply of energy for the society that completely relies on it to function. For this, the 
energy sector is involved in exploring and developing oil, gas reserves, oil and gas 
drilling, and refining.  
The energy sector empowers products and services that help with enhancing and 
extending life through powering computers, transportation, communications, and 
innovative medical equipment. Therefore, it is essential for the energy sector to 
operate in a way that ensures the safety and security of the whole associated energy 
chain all the way from generation to supply Melchiorre (2018).  
These requirements have led the energy sector to undergo undeniable changes, 
particularly electricity infrastructures. The massive digitalization of the energy 
infrastructure has led to another evolution where systems can be controlled 
remotely, and the supervision or monitoring of such complex infrastructure has 
become more optimized. European cybersecurity organization (ECSO 2018).   
The digital transformation has given the energy sector many benefits which are 
envisioned to be a more economical, reliable supply of energy and sustainable.  
However, it has led the energy infrastructures to be more exposed to cyber threats. 
The number of attacks is increasing due to new data interfaces that are used today 
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such as new connection-oriented meters, other smart devices, and collectors. Which 
in turn offers new ways of entry for attackers. Therefore, reducing the vulnerabilities 
and increasing resilience of the systems within the energy sector is essential. ECSO 
(2018).  
1.2 Problem statement  
There is a lot of research that exists, which looks at how the energy sector is one of 
the top five most targeted sectors for attacks worldwide (Wueest, C. 2014). Thus, 
understanding what type of threats and/or challenges exist, and how they are dealt 
with in a security and resilience manner is of importance to this research work. 
When investigating some of the attacks which has happened, and how they have been 
prevented, Wueest summed it up best with:  
 “Most of them could have been prevented by following best practice guidelines for 
protecting the IT infrastructure and the industrial component.”  (Wueest, C. 2014, 
p.1).  
  
Therefore, this research work will look further into what methods the energy sector 
implement/practice to increase or maintain their Cybersecurity and resilience. We 
have a preliminary research to understand the problem and conducted a qualitative 
exploratory study to investigate the following questions.  
  
1. What is the role of training to increase cyber awareness and encourage 
best practices for cybersecurity measure in the energy sector?  
2. What are the rules and regulations followed and applied by the 
different stakeholders in the energy sector or across the supply chain?  
3. What are the various levels of resilience awareness among the distinct 
categories of employees?  
1.3 Research questions and objectives  
The goal for this qualitative research is to study what challenges the energy sector 
faces, what are the best countermeasures in the form of practices that could be 
deployed, and how well these practices work.   
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We have conducted several interviews with individuals that work in the energy sector 
to gather as much necessary data as possible. By having these interviews, we should 
be able to answer the research questions mentioned below:  
  
“What are the characteristics of resilient critical infrastructures within the energy 
sector, and how can this be achieved?”   
  
“What are the best practices used to achieve resilience within the energy sector, and 
how are they carried out to increase the awareness of their employees?”  
 
The research questions look at what resilience means for the energy sector, and how 
well practices are implemented to maintain resilience. By looking into the connection 
between practices and employees, we seek to understand how beneficial these 
practices really are. Therefore, the main objective of this exploratory study is to:  
  
1. Examine and understand resilience in the energy sector.  
2. Identify best practices used to achieve resilience.  
3. How these best practices affect employees.    
1.4 Rationale and contribution  
The motivation of researchers behind this study is to explore the understanding and 
awareness of resilience within the energy sector. This study identifies challenges that 
affect the energy sector and looks at what practices are used to combat these 
challenges, to understand the relationship between resilience and practices. 
Our empirical findings start by discovering threats and challenges that exist within 
the energy sector today and how they are addressed. It then leads to finding what 
characterizes resilience and how that is achieved when working in the energy sector. 
Lastly it shows the different practices used to both achieve and increase the 
awareness of resilience amongst the employees. We focus on organizations that work 
with CIS within the energy sector and reflect on what resilience is and how they 
achieve it.   
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1.5 Research approach  
This study implements a qualitative research approach and exploratory research 
perspective to examine and uncover the phenomenon in depth. The technique for 
gathering data is primarily used though semi-structured interviews, supported by 
documents and frameworks used in the research. The study started by having a 
literature review which was performed between January February 2021. Followed by 
several meetings to decide what type of research approach to apply. Eleven 
interviews were then carried out between March and April 2021. It is important to 
point out that the selected research subjects are limited to Norwegian context and 
commenced from NC spectrum’s network. 
We analyze the data gathered from the interview based on the structure of existing 
literature review, where we start by looking at security, framework, resilience, and 
other best practice methods that the energy sector implements to achieve desired 
level of resilience.  
NC spectrum, a Norwegian organization that works with different stakeholders in the 
energy sectors and specializes in cybersecurity, is the key stakeholder in this research 
work. One of their employees held a lecture about security within the energy sector in 
the third semester, which motivated us to contact them and ask if they had any 
research area or question, they would like us to examine. After a thorough meeting 
with NC spectrum and our supervisors, it was decided to investigate the two research 
questions mentioned above. With their help we managed to contact several 
organizations within the energy sector and set up interviews with our research 
subject. 
1.6 Scope and limitation 
This study looks at what characterizes a resilient critical infrastructure within the 
energy sector and how it is achieved. In addition, the study looks at what best 
practices are used to achieve resilience. The objective was to examine and explore 
how critical infrastructures operate, deal with security, and achieve a desired level of 
resilience, focusing on organizations that work in the energy sector.  
When working with critical infrastructure, there is always the issue of confidentiality 
where we might not be able to get the information that we need to get a conclusion to 
our result or validate our findings.  
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Contacting employees within the energy sector and asking about security 
measurements used within their organization, how well and on what level it is 
implemented, may result in them not wanting to answer the questions. Not only is 
the possibility that they are not willing to answer it, but how well does their honest 
opinion translate into the reality of the situation. If we only interview a few select 
members of each organization, do these few people reflect the actual situation within 
the organization, or did we just sample on the end of a scale. Another factor is if an 
employee has a negative opinion about their organization and will not express their 
honest opinion about the situation in fear of being traced back to the individual.   
1.7 Thesis Overview  
Chapter 1 - Introduction covers an overview of the problem and represents the 
research questions.  
  
Chapter 2 - Related Research discusses related research that yields further 
understanding of 1) what characterizes resilience and 2) what best practices are used 
to achieve resilience.   
  
Chapter 3 - Research Approach explores the choice of a qualitative study with an 
exploratory approach. Moreover, data selection, analysis, validity, and ethical 
consideration are presented.  
  
Chapter 4 - Empirical Findings addresses the findings collected from the 
fieldwork. A thematic mapping of the interviews has been performed to collect these 
findings.  
  
Chapter 5 - Discussion researchers discuss the findings collected from their 
perspective and academics.  
  
Chapter 6 – Conclusion and contribution whatthis research has Summerizes 
the project work and contribution to IS. It provides a conclusion and a brief 
reflection on future work.  
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2.0 Background and related research  
To gain a better understanding of state of the art of the energy sector’s security and 
resilience. We organized a literature review to get an overview of the security 
challenges, resilience, and other best practices that are used within the research field. 
We decided to follow Kitchenham’s guidelines (kitchenham & Charters, 2007), the 
objective was to get an understanding of existing research related to our research 
questions. Kitchenham, (2007) states that these guidelines have been made with the 
following intentions: 
 
- Assist researchers in conducting empirical studies. 
- Summarize the existing evidence concerning technology. 
- Identify any gaps in current research to suggest areas for further investigation. 
- Provide a background to position new research activities appropriately. 
 
The literature review serves as a foundation to develop the research question by 
finding gaps and issues emerge or have been highlighted by researchers in the field. 
To that end a further investigation in this research work will be conducted. In the 
literature review phase, a total of 33 articles were reviewed consistently and relevant 
to our research. The research was conducted based on search string and criteria 
explained in Appendix 2: which provided a method in finding these articles. The 
following categories and literature themes emerged: CIS, resilience, security 
challenges within the energy sector, framework, and practices. These categories and 
themes in Table 2 were reviewed so that we could find more information about our 
research work and how they were tied together. The research work started by doing 
the following: 
• To discover what defines resilience and how it is achieved in CIS, we first had 
to uncover what is CIS and the importance of it. 
• That led to learning about the security of CIS and what challenges it faces. 
• Afterwards we looked at the term resilience, what characterizes it, and how it 
is achieved in the energy sector. 
• Framework was then the next thing to be covered due to the importance of it 
in CIS. 
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• Lastly, the research focused on finding as many best practices implemented in 
the CIS that are related to security and resilience. 




 Category 1: Critical Infrastructure Systems 
Identification and 
designation of CIS 
(EU Directive 2008/114/EC, 2008)  “‘Critical infrastructure’ means an 
asset, system or part thereof located 
in Member States which is essential 
for the maintenance of vital societal 
functions, health, safety, security, 
economic or social well-being of 
people, and the disruption or 
destruction of which would have a 
significant impact in a Member State 
as a result of the failure to maintain 
those functions.” 
Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Systems  
(Croope, S. V., & McNeil, S. 2011).  “The objective of the decision support 
system is to reduce the vulnerability 
of places and infrastructure systems 
through the use of mitigation 
strategies that increase system 
resilience and resistance to the 
stresses imposed by disasters.” 
Critical infrastructure 
interdependencies 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001) “What happens to one infrastructure 
can directly and indirectly affect other 
infrastructures, impact large 
geographic regions and send ripples 




Nickolov, E. (2006) "The best practices and resources on 
cyber security policy developed in the 
last years provide valuable guidance 
both to industrialized and developing 
countries.” 
What is Critical 
infrastructure systems 
(Jensen, C. 2019) “Critical infrastructure consists of “the 
assets, systems, and networks, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that their 
incapacitation or destruction would 
have a debilitating effect on security, 
national economic security, national 




Xiao-Juan, L., & Li-Zhen, H. 2010 critical infrastructure is of the first 
rank, it comprises of some 
fundamental infrastructures for daily 
production and living, so the 
vulnerability and interdependency of 
critical infrastructure systems (CIS) is 
a hot issue for exploration. 
Hva er kritisk Sikkerhetstoppmøtet, (2014) “«Kritisk infrastruktur de anlegg og 
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infrastruktur systemer som er helt nødvendige for å 
opprettholde samfunnets kritiske 
funksjoner, som igjen dekker 




European Commission, (2007) “Stakeholders must share information 
on CIP, particularly on measures 
concerning the security of critical 
infrastructure and protected systems, 
interdependency studies and CIP 
related vulnerability, threat and risk 
assessments.” 
Importance of critical 
infrastructure  
(Melchiorre. 2018) “It is shown that the protection of 
critical energy infrastructure is 
essential for states because the well-
being of their societies depends on its 
good functioning.” 
Category 2: Resilience in critical infrastructure 
Resilience 
management 
(Herrera, et al., 2018) “A model provides traceability and 
meaningfulness for tools in view of 
different contexts of application, 
which becomes a fundamental 
support to decision-making in the 
scope of resilience management.” 
Factors and elements 
of resilience in CIS 
(Rehak et al., 2018) “Factors determining the resilience of 
these elements are identified, both in 
terms of technical resilience (i.e., 
robustness and recoverability) and 
organizational resilience (i.e., 
adaptability).” 
Understanding 
resilience and safety  
(Hollnagel, E. 2016) “New types of accidents have, 
historically speaking, always led to 
new types of causes but without 
challenging the underlying 
assumption of linear causality. We 
have therefore become so used to 
explain accidents in terms of cause -




(Jensen, C. 2019) “Enhancing security is, perhaps, the 
most fundamental component of 
critical infrastructure protection.” 
Resilience of 
interdependencies 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001) “Cyber interdependencies are relatively 
new and a result of the pervasive 
computerization and automation of 
infrastructures over the last several 
decades.” 
What is resilience, and 
how can it be 
integrated. 
Stavland, B., & Bruvoll, J. (2019) “Resilienshåndtering tar utgangspunkt 
i resultatene fra resiliensevalueringen 
og benytter dem til å utvikle planer 
for å modifisere resiliensnivået.” 
Enhancing resilience 
of energy system 
National academies of science, “For decades, the planners and 
operators of the system have taken 
care to assure that the electric system 
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engineering and Medicine (NAS. 2017) is engineered and routinly operated 
to achive high levels of reliability. 
Increasingly, the system’s planners 
and operators are focusing on 
resilience as well.” 
Resilience in various 
countries. 
(Gjesvik, 2019) “The Finnish approach to cyber 
security has been primarily defensive, 
focused on measures of resilience.” 
Resilience 
Management 
Guidelines for Critical 
Infrastructures. 
(Herrera, et al., 2018) “Targeted at policy makers, it provides 
an overview of essential resilience 
concepts, methods and techniques to 
attain results from these Projects and 
to work towards an integrated 




(F.D petit, et al., 2013) “The main benefit of the RI was to give 
the critical infrastructure 
owners/operators a performance 
indicator of the resilience of their 
facilities that could support their 
decisions in risk and resilience 
management.” 
Resilience: Designing 
for the unexpected 
(Boumphrey & Bruno, 2015) “In parallel to this, rapid technological 
change can provide both 
opportunities and threats to 
resilience.” 
Understanding 
landscape of resilience 
(Juliet Mian et al., 2018) “The changing energy landscape, 
through decentralisation of energy 
supplies and the forming of 
microgrids is making resilience and 
integrated systems approaches 
increasingly importance. “ 
Highly reliable 
organizations 
(Gifun, J. F., & Karydas, D. M. 2010) “The model proposed herein was 
developed and derived from 
acomprehensive examination of the 
following organizational models: the 
High Reliability Organization, the 
Disaster Resistant University, the 
Resilient Enterprise, Enterprise Risk 
Management, Risk-Based Process 
Safety, Reactor Oversight Process, 





(Ramsay, & Kelly, T. 2009) “This extension of thinking, planning, 
and anticipation is vital, because the 
assessment of the residual risk may, 
as in these accidents, ultimately be 
proven to have been significantly 
flawed.” 
HRO managing the 
unexpected 
(Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon 2009) “HROs can teach managers in more 
traditional organizations a great deal 
about preparing themselves – and 
their companies – for extreme 
situations.” 
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HRO and CIS 
resilience 
(Fritts et al. 2017) “In contrast, however, academic and 
practitioner evidence did suggest 
implementation strategies and 
tactics. Although never formally 
validated, High Reliability Theory 
(HRT) has been suggested as an 
implementation approach to CI 
protection (CIP).” 
Category 3: Frameworks 
Identify the 
frameworks used 
specific within the 
energy sector. 
(u.s. department of energy office of 
electricity delivery and energy 
reliability 2015), (Kwasinski, A. 2016). 
“This proposed framework is built on 
fundamental concepts that serve to 
quantitatively represent power grids’ 
performance during natural disasters 
and other extreme events.” 
Identify the 
frameworks used 
within CIS generally 
including the energy 
sector. 
 (Barret. M. 2018), (Sedgewick (2014) 
(European Commission. 2007), (NSCI. 
2019),(CPNI. 2021), (European 
Commission. 2013), (Xiao-Juan, L., & 
Li-Zhen, H. 2010), (Yusta et al. 2011), 
(Department of Homeland Security. 
2013), (Rinaldi et al. 2001), (Nickolov, 
E. 2006). 
“The National Plan builds upon the 
critical infrastructure risk 
management framework introduced 
in the 2006 NIPP.” 
 
“The Framework identifies principles of 
cooperation (i.e. responsibility, 
comprehensiveness, partnerships, 
coherency of action, risk-based, all-
hazards, resilience, clear 
communications, and continuous 
improvement) and it recognizes that 
emergency management is comprised 
of interdependent risk-based 
functions: prevention, mitigation, 
preparedness, response and 
recovery.” 
Category 4: Practices 
Practices used in CIS 
or energy sector. 
(Wueest, C. 2014), (Department of 
Homeland Security 2013), (M.T., 
Ramsay, C.G., & Kelly, T. 2009), 
(Lykou et al. 2018),  (Gjesvik, L. 2019), 
(Jensen, C. 2019), (EU Directive 
2008/114/EC, Identification and 
designation of European critical 
infrastructures 2008), (Sabino, V. 
2020), (Bailey et al. 2020), (u.s. 
department of energy office of 
electricity delivery and energy 
reliability 2015), (Labak et al 2016), 
(Skandsen, H. 2020), (Miron, W. 
Muita, K. 2014), (European 
Commission. 2013), (Kallio et al. 
2016),(NSCI. 2019), (Barrett, 2018), 
(Vilnius, 2018). 
“For all regular client computers, the 
well-established best practice 
guidelines apply. These computers 
are often the first ones to be 
attacked.” 
 
“Utilities should leverage their best 
practices to ensure that all employees 
are aware of the specific threats 
facing the organization and the 
specific indicators they, as employees, 
should be looking for in order to 
contribute to the overall security of 
the company and its customers.” 
 
“It is concluded that organizations can 
become wiser by looking at incidents 
outside their own sector and by using 
these recurring themes to explore the 
resilience of their emergency plans. 
Recommendations are also made for 
best practices to improve the learning 
of lessons within organizations.” 
Forskrift om fordeling  (Olje og energidepartementet, 2019) “Forskriften kommer til anvendelse ved 
planlegging, bygging, eierskap og 
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og bruk av energi drift av anlegg for produksjon, 
omforming, overføring og fordeling 
av elektrisk energi, varmeenergi 
produsert i fjernvarme- og 
fjernkjøleanlegg, samt ved omsetning 




(Bhatt et al., 2014) “Security information and event 
management (SIEM) systems are an 
important tool used in SOCs; they 
collect security events from many 
diverse sources in enterprise 
networks, normalize the events to a 
common format, store the 
normalized events for forensic 
analysis, and correlate the events to 




(Bailey et al., 2020) “These vulnerabilities first came to 
light as early as 2010, when a Puerto 
Rican utility estimated that 
tampering with wireless smart 
meters could result in revenue 





(Sabino, 2020) “Effective cybersecurity awareness 
training is another essential action 
that organizations can take to keep 




(Lykou et al., 2018) “Which reveals the need for security 
reinforcement with suitable 
measures to increase cybersecurity 
protection.” 
Category 5: Security challenges 
Security of CIS (Jensen, 2019) “Similarly, in the cyber realm, security 
means identifying virtual 
vulnerabilities and addressing those 
vulnerabilities.” 
Analysis, evaluation of 
CIS protection 
(Nickolov, 2006) “Analyzing of the current reaction 
abilities of network elements and 
systems based on their reaction to 
possible attack scenario.” 
Monitoring and 
security of CIS 
(Kyriakides & Polycarpou, 2014) “In particular, this monitoring system 
is based on a novel hybrid 
architecture, in which different 
sensors, architectures and physical 
phenomena under monitoring coexist 
and cooperate to provide different 
views of the same physical 
phenomenon.” 
Cybersecurity of smart 
energy sector network 
The European Cybersecurity 
Organisation (ECSO, 2018) 
“These services rely on interconnected 
smart devices, such as sensors and 
actuators, widely deployed in 
households to measure energy use 
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and reduce energy equipment 
consumption to prevent overload.” 
Energy sector attacks (Wueest, C, 2014) “To stop this self-inflicted DDoS attack, 
part of the monitoring and control 
network had to be isolated and 
disconnected. Fortunately the 




(Lars Gjesvik, 2019) “For the protection of critical systems, 
the concern is not necessarily 
espionage and criminal activity per 
se, but the risk that digital 
technologies would be used to destroy 
and disrupt their functionality.” 
2.1 Critical infrastructure systems:  
Critical infrastructure systems are essential for their continued service to maintain 
the nation's socioeconomic systems, (Croope & McNeil. 2011). Critical infrastructures 
are defined as ‘‘assets, systems, or parts thereof, essential for the maintenance of 
vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic, or social well-being’’ (EU 
Directive 2008/114/EC p.43). (Rinaldi et al. 2001 p.13) refers to this definition of CIS 
in his article:” The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising 
identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and 
distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential 
to the defense and economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning of 
governments at all levels, and society as a whole”. Furthermore, in the report 
“Society’s critical functions,” published by Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og 
beredskap 1(DSB) in 2015, there is a list of systems/functions that are deemed 
critical. According to the list made by DSB (2015), say that a system is critical if, 
within seven days after the system has failed, society is no longer able to satisfy one 
or more basic needs. CIS consists of electrical power plants, telecommunication, 
transportation network, oil and natural gas systems, water distribution system, 
banking and financial, healthcare service and security services (G. Ellinas et al. 
2014). These infrastructures manage to provide significant social and economic 
benefits that modern society is dependent on being available, reliable, safe, and 
secure, (Nickolov, 2006). In addition, Nickolov (2006) mentions if CIS is damaged it 
would have a serious impact on citizens, the functioning of government and 
industries, or other adverse effects. This makes the importance of CIS crucial and 
 
1 The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection 
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must be functioning at least at a minimal level for survival of private and public 
sectors. To ensure the survival of private and public sectors, CIS needs to have 
proper protection from the challenges and threats it faces. These threats can be 
categorized into three classes: human error, natural threats and accidental or 
technical threat (Robles et. al 2008). Additionally, Kröger (2008) mentions five 
factors that affect the risk of failure in critical infrastructure:   
 
1. System-related factors related to complexity and interconnections.  
2. Technological factors related to innovation and operation.   
3. Environmental factors such as resource access and Climatic conditions.   
4. Institutional factors such as market liberalization, regulation, and 
legislation.   
5. Societal factors such as the public's risk perceptions, urbanization, and 
exposure to terrorist acts.  
 
The increased connectivity and interdependencies between such systems increase the 
complexity of managing critical infrastructure and modelling the risk of 
cybersecurity threats (Rahman et al.,2011; Xiao-Juan & Li Zhen, 2010). Therefore, 
the essentiality of CIS cannot be understated and the protection and resilience of it is 
paramount, (F.D Petit et. al 2013).  
2.2 Security challenges of the energy sector  
Cybersecurity could be seen as a complicated practice that varies from being a 
nuisance all the way to high-level national security threats. Protecting critical 
infrastructure such as the energy sector has been a concern for states for well over a 
decade and it still faces challenges that could be problematic for many reasons 
(Gjesvik, 2019).  
Some of these challenges have become more prominent over the years such as 
increased complexity, a natural phenomenon with digitalization where more and 
newer integration of the system improves it and makes it more complex. Going back 
a few years ago the threats were tangible and focused a lot on being physical threats, 
such as floods, wildfires, and hurricanes (Jensen, 2019). The impact of a natural 
disaster can have a dire effect on the energy sector, even when they are not physically 
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impeached sudden demand surges during crisis can provoke blackouts, leading to 
loss or denial of service” (Nickolov, 2006).  
Nevertheless, today the energy sector is susceptible to other frequent threats (e.g., 
fault of equipment or software, human error, and insider attack), which does make it 
more difficult to operate, secure, and ensure that the system is robust (Kyriakides & 
Polycarpou, 2014). In addition, one of the biggest threats or challenges that have 
increased throughout the years are cyberattacks, which can harm systems by shut it 
down, disrupt operations or giving remote access to attackers. Cyberattacks could 
leak sensitive information, critical equipment, and harm third party partners, which 
makes it particularly important that these challenges are addressed. Based on a study 
by European Cybersecurity Organization (ECSO) in 2018, about cybersecurity for the 
energy sector, there have been several major attacks targeting the energy sector, like 
Stuxnet in Iran or Black Energy in Ukraine, (ECSO, 2018) Attacks on the energy 
sector have become an ever-increasing issue, and measurements must be taken to 
prepare this sector for these threats. Table 3 shows the possible threats CIS with the 
energy sector included.  
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Table 3: List of attacks and threats based on CIS studies. (ECSO 2018) 
 
 
Table 4: Projected losses/hour for various industries during IT outages. (Kyriakides & Polycarpou, 2014)   
 
 
Kyriakides and Polycarpou (2014) mentioned based on estimates from studies and 
surveys performed by IT industry analyst firms that the assessment cost of 
cybersecurity incident and downtime that affect the energy sector is one of the three 
most impacted sector and has the highest incident and downtime cost as seen in 
Table 4. 
Wueest, (2014, p1) stated, “The energy sector has become a major focus for target 
attacks and is now among the top five most targeted sectors worldwide”.  
Since the energy sector is such a clear target by hacktivists, espionage, or foreign 
governments there is a need to protect it. Wueest mentioned when talking about 
attacks against the energy sector “Most of them could have been prevented by 
following best practice guidelines for protecting the IT infrastructure and the 
industrial component.”   
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Other security challenges within various sectors (energy sector included) that are 
smaller states such as Norway could have restrictions on how to deal with incidents 
due to the size of organizations, where their resources could be limited, and practices 
provided on a European level might not be implemented fully. In his article Lars 
Gjesvik (2019), identifies that the regional and European cooperation is not at the 
desired level, while some of the initiatives might be implemented, they are 
unfortunately too recent and too limited to have any significant impact. He 
additionally mentioned that cooperation and collaboration are essential for states, 
and these are not at the extensive level that it should be.  
2.3 Maintain security & resilience.  
Resilience has in recent years increased in popularity and can be used in several 
different definitions, these can be the city, social, disaster, ecology, and more. The 
multitude of definitions can be viewed in the paper of Herrera. et al. (2018) where 
Five European projects conducted literature reviews on resilience, and one of these 
identified over 300 different definitions.    
Hereafter in this thesis the term resilience is defined as the system's ability to 
maintain function during stress and exertion, and that there is an element of 
learning.   
The purpose of increased resilience is to improve future handling of issues both 
known and unknown, which can impact a system or function. In this respect, 
resilience plays a crucial role in ensuring the security and reliability of systems 
within the CIS (energy sector included) and is understood as a cyclic process based 
on the continual enhancement of system prevention, absorption, recovery, and 
adaptation (Rehak, et al. 2018). Erik Hollnagel states “A system is resilient if it can 
adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following events (changes, disturbances, 
and opportunities), and thereby sustain required operations under both expected 
and unexpected conditions.” (Hollnagel, E.2014, pg 376)   
 
Jensen, (2019, pg 1) further states “In cyber-centric environments, resilience builds 
on security to round out a comprehensive cyber defense program that addresses all 
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phases of preparation and implements steps to prepare for, and respond to, any 
cyber threats.”   
Due to interdependencies of these systems, Rindali (et al. 2001. Pg 11 - 25) mentions 
that if one of these infrastructures or sectors were to be disrupted, it could create a 
cascading effect that could damage or destroy others with them, which in return 
makes each sector as important as the other.  
 
 
Figure 1: Umbrella concept (Øien m.fl., 2018) 
 
In Figure 1, the resilience is set in the context of risk assessment, emergency 
preparedness, and business continuity, and shows how resilience can be seen as a 
process in time, with different steps of before, during, and after an incident has 
occurred. During the two first steps, understanding risk and anticipating/preparing 
shows the resilience curve as it is or its normal stage. When an incident occurs, we 
move over to the absorb/withstand and respond/recover steps. These define the time 
of loss of functionality and where the resilience is tested. If the resilience is strong 
then the curve will not change to much from its normal state. After the incident is 
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resolved, the next steps are adapt/learn which are where progress can occur, as seen 
where the resilience curve has risen higher than before the incident. Thus, 
improvement has been made, and the system is stronger than it was before the 
incident, (Stavland, B., & Bruvoll, J. 2019).  
Figure 1 illustrates how resilience functions, and how it can arch to visualize a 
potential loss of functionality. Creating, maintaining, and improving resilience can 
massively impact business economics, its level of continuation, and its capability to 
handle threats, (Stavland, B., & Bruvoll, J. 2019).  
  
A report written by the National Academies of Sciences, looked at resilience related 
to the energy sector in the USA, and how to achieve a resilient system (Figure 2, NAS, 
2017).  
 
Figure 2: NAS Achieving resilience (NAS 2017) 
A resilient system can withstand sudden attacks/incidents and continue to work, it 
can also, deal with interruptions, and have the ability to rapidly recover and bring 
functionalities of the system back to normal. The NAS report explains it as follows:  
“It's not just about reducing the possibility of power outages, but also about limiting 
the extent and consequences of this happening, rapid recovery, and learning lessons 
from what has happened. A resilient system must minimize power outages, but 
recognize that it may occur and prepare to deal with them and learn from it” (NAS, 
2017: p,1)  
  
Different states and organizations could measure their resilience by using the 
following four indicators (kwasinski, 2016).   
1. The ability to resist both internal and external attacks/threats.  
2. The ability to recover after an incident.  
3. Capacity for planning and preparation.  
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4. The ability to adapt.  
  
By following the indicators above the maintenance of systems within the energy 
sector and other CIS, can become more thorough. The energy sectors could look at 
historical events and decide on how to isolate and control upcoming events. This will 
lead to having a system that works as intended where nothing unexpected could 
occur, (FFI-rapport, 2019).  
  
Countries such as Norway deal with resilience and cybersecurity of their systems by 
giving the responsibility to the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(NVE). NVE helps the energy sector by supervising their systems, write a regulation 
and advise on how to approach cybersecurity to become a resilient CIS, (Lars Gjesvik, 
2019). NVE works as well with KraftCERT, which is a private company owned by 
most energy operators. KraftCERT’s functions as an advisory body and provides 
information to several organizations, where they specialize in industrial control 
system (ICS) however, with security they have a limited role and capacity 
(KraftCERT, 2019). Additionally, KraftCERT has been added along to the energy 
supply preparedness organization (KBO) so that the security and resilience of the 
energy sector are prepared in a sufficient manner (Energilovforskriften2, 2019). Lars 
Gjesvik, (2019) mentions in his report that there is another approach towards 
resilience management. This focuses more on the measurement of resilience that is 
built on existing approaches to security. Including the history of cooperation between 
public and private actors that aimed at enhancing resilience by having the whole of 
society contributing to overall security. Figure 3 shows that Norway has a joined 
cyber coordination network of a response and management of cyber security. The 
Figure represents both the complexity of the response system to cybersecurity 
incidents in Norway and if an attack happens it would impact different level of 




2 The Energy Regulations 
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Figure 3: Norwegian Cybersecurity Approach (Gjesvik, 2019) 
Enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructures has been a priority for many 
countries due to the consequences it could have if they are not prepared sufficiently. 
To achieve resilience, the system must be able to withstand threats, mitigate impacts 
of a threat/attack, and be able to return to normal operations as soon as possible. 
Looking at these “requirements” the U.S Homeland security (DHS) decided to 
partner up with Argonne National Laboratory to develop a methodology that would 
assist CIS on how to make decisions for risk management, business continuity, and 
disaster response F.D Petit, Et. Al. (2013). The methodology developed was called 
Resilience Measurement Index (RMI), It was formulated to capture the aspect of 
resilience for critical infrastructure and can be combined with other tools so that CIS 
could be able to reduce the significance and duration of impacts of attacks by looking 
at the following four groups in figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Resilience Measurement Index (RMI) (Petit, Et. Al. 2013). 
To increase the specificity of how CIS could achieve a wanted level of security and 
resilience, RMI looks at each group and adds subcomponents that would be relevant 
to the contribution of the given component, such as the one shown in figure 5. F.D 
Petit, Et. Al. (2013).  
 
 
Figure 5: RMI Preparedness (Petit, Et. Al. 2013). 
Having a resilience-based approach when it comes to CIS security is essential, and it 
needs to be considered as an inherent part of a project, as opposed to an afterthought 
(Boumphrey & Bruno, 2015). Furthermore, Juliet Mian et. al. (2018) reports that 
there are additional ways of achieving/enhancing resilience. The focus lies on looking 
at policies, practices, and sharing of information. The paper argues that the best way 
of achieving resilience is by having a combination of different approaches, and that 
no single policy instrument is the answer to resilience challenges. The study further 
states that sharing information and experiences between sectors, cities, and 
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countries has been a powerful tool to engage people in thinking more broadly about 
the benefit of resilience.  
2.4 Frameworks  
To further increase the resilience and security of CIS, there is a need to develop 
frameworks that can assist in monitoring and, controlling the security of such 
systems, (Kyriakides & Polycarpou 2014). NIST published a framework (Sedgewick, 
2014), whereas according to them the framework created is “A Prioritized, flexible 
and cost-effective approach helps to promote the protection and resilience of critical 
infrastructure and other sectors important to the economy and national security.” 
Croope & McNeil (2011) argue in their paper that a framework they created could be 
implemented in the aftermath of a disaster by having a set of rehabilitation tools 
which will help both repair and improve the resilience of CIS.  
  
To handle the security risks within the various CIS, at least twelve countries or 
regions have defined criteria for security standards and the way to implement them 
(Yusta et al., 2011). Table 5 shows that the European Union (EU) has created a 
critical infrastructure regime through the European Program for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). The United States has a cooperative framework 
that has been created with the assistance of Homeland security. As for Canada and 
the United Kingdom, Cooperative frameworks are in place as well. (Miron & Muita 
2014) 
 
Table 5: Frameworks created by countries or regions. (Miron & Muita 2014) 
Region Regulation Model 
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United Kingdom Centre for the 




United States National 
Infrastructure and 





Furthermore, based on a paper released by the U.S. Department of energy (2015), 
which focuses heavily on cybersecurity resilience that is built upon the framework 
produced by NIST (Barrett, 2018). Meaning that different sectors not only use the 
frameworks provided by their region/country, but they add other frameworks such 
as NIST (Barrett, 2018). This framework contributes to creating a set of activities 
where the goal is to achieve specific cybersecurity outcomes and provide 
examples/guidance on how to make the systems resilient. The paper specifies that 
the core of this framework is not a checklist, but as essential outcomes that are 
determined by the industry as helpful in managing cybersecurity. NIST (Barrett, 
2018), states that the framework helps different types of CIS sector with the 
following:   
1. Describe their current cybersecurity posture.  
2. Describe their target state for cybersecurity.  
3. Identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement within the context of 
a continuous and repeatable process.  
4. Assess progress towards the target state.  
5. Communication among internal and external stakeholders about 
cybersecurity risk.  
  
NIST (Barrett, 2018) further states that “The framework enables organizations - 
regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication - to 
apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving the 
security and resilience of critical infrastructure”.  
 The way to improve and maintain a resilient CIS, the framework focuses on five core 
functions that are performed concurrently and continuously shown in table 6 which 
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is used to improve the resilience and cybersecurity of critical infrastructures within 
the energy sector.  Function and Category Unique Identifiers 
Table 6: Function and Category unique identifiers (Barrett 2018) 
 
2.5 Highly Reliable Organizations   
Pettersen and Schulman (2016) implies that resilience and reliability are equally 
important, and explicitly identified that HRO’s are associated with critical 
infrastructures.  
The definition of Highly reliable organizations (HRO) was originally made by 
Roberts (1989) who stated the following:  
“There is a class of organizations that can do catastrophic harm to themselves and 
a larger public. Within this larger set of potentially harmful organizations there is a 
subset which has operated extraordinarily reliably over an extended period. 
Operational reliability rivals short term efficiency as major goals in these 
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organizations. Extraordinary attention is paid to operational reliability both 
because of the inherent dangers of the situation and because outcomes reliability is 
impossible to realize without operational reliability. Hence, we call these 
organizations "high reliability" organizations” (Roberts, 1989, p. 112). This 
definition means that HRO are organizations that manage to anticipate, resist, and 
recover from incidents by following specific policies, and practices they have which 
focus on reliability, disaster resistance, high organizational quality, and resilience 
(Gifun, & Karydas, 2010). Crichton, Ramsay, and Kelly (2009) argue that 
organizations could enhance their resilience and share the knowledge with other CIS 
by having an emergency planning approach. Hassel, and Zio (2013) recommended 
that the energy sector systems need to have reliability and are essential for their 
systems. Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2009) suggested that CIS should look at all the 
HRO’s hallmarks and implement them, so that they have the capabilities needed to 
improve their security and resilience. From the articles mentioned above, reliability, 
organizational resilience, and critical infrastructure, we can see that the concept of 
using HRO hallmarks in CIS can be beneficial and will improve or provide resilience. 
In addition, the US Department of Homeland security implies in their publications 
(2013, 2015) that a successful critical infrastructure protection (CIP) needs to have 
resilience as an anchoring concept. Furthermore Fritts et al. (2017) concluded that 
the five HRO hallmarks and the five DHS CISR priority areas may not have the same 
construct, but they have a conceptual convergence, where both aim to achieve the 
same goals.   
Table 7 shows the similarities with the DHS priority areas. Thus, HRO can be 
combined with other CIP to achieve resilience.  
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Table 7: Comparison of HRO hallmarks to DHS priority areas. (Cantu 2020) 
 
2.6 Other best practice methods  
In addition to these regional regulations and frameworks, some countries have made 
their legislation and frameworks specifically for each of the sectors that need to be 
implemented in every CIS sector. Norway has the energy contingency regulations 
which is a framework that will provide better security against espionage, sabotage, 
and terror at a time when the threat and risk picture is constantly changing. 
(Energilovforskriften3 2019). Several organizations combine different frameworks to 
achieve the best possible security, (U.S. Department of energy, 2015). 
When it comes to maintaining security and achieving the highest level of resilience, 
most energy sectors use best-practice guidelines provided by NIST, ISO standards, 
and or the European Commission to provide the “how-to” solution to achieve 
security. “Prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective 
approach to manage cybersecurity risk for those processes, information, and systems 
directly involved in the delivery of critical infrastructure services.” (Barrett, 2017)  
  
When it comes to protection and mitigation against attacks within the energy sector, 
Wueest, (2014) mentions several countermeasures that can be used such as:   
A) Email filtering which can help prevent certain spear-phishing attempts can be 
beneficial for untrained personnel.   
 
3 The Energy Regulations 
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B) Data loss prevention (DLP) can track the flow and access of critical information 
and prevent it from leaving or encrypting the information.   
C) Security information and event management system (SIEM) provides a main area 
that collects alerts into this place, by gathering and analyzing data from several 
systems, to detect any abnormal behavior or to find potential attacks (Bhatt et al., 
2014).  
While having protection may not fully stop the attacks, the implementations can still 
be worthwhile to slow and mitigate attacks. Additionally, Wueest, (2014) states 
“Industrial control systems (ICS) should be specially protected and monitored. The 
control system and control network should be secured. Where possible, ICS should 
be separate from the Intranet. Isolating these networks alone is often not enough to 
protect the control network, but it can make it more difficult for attackers to 
succeed.   
  
Most organizations use analytic teams that monitor threats and provide a holistic 
view on threats and other factors such as legal, geopolitical, and economic) which 
shape the threat environment they need to defend against, (Bailey et al., 2020). 
Additionally, t e analytic team provides an effective cybersecurity awareness and by 
having this, the organizations teach employees to identify what kind of threats exist 
and how they can keep their information secure and mitigated from attacks like 
Phishing, ransomware, and social engineering (Sabino,2020). Organizations as well 
as create and practice incident response plans to build confidence, muscle memory, 
and process clarity so that when an actual incident happens the organization is 
prepared to handle these situations (McNeil 2011).  
Another way of increasing security is by looking at the importance of reducing third-
party risk and understanding their security posture. Sabino, (2020) states “Ask 
questions to identify their potential exposure areas, technical controls to data and 
systems, network segmentation practices and authentication tools used.”  
  
There are many different methods an organization can implement to improve their 
resilience, and the choice of methods may depend on the organizations themselves. 
By looking at different practices used in different organizations and sectors and how 
they conduct their method, we can look for patterns. 
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 Figure 6 shows “The identified practices for smart airports have been categorized 
into three main groups: i) Technical; ii) Organizational and iii) Policies and 
Standards.” (Lykou, G, et al. 2018) 
 
 
Figure 6: Cybersecurity Good Practices Classification (Lykou, G, et al. 2018) 
Figure 6 shows an example of a smart airport. It shows clear goals for the several 
aspects within the airport, and while some systems and functions may be specialized 
for airports, much of these best practices are used in many organizations, such as 
disaster recovery and incident response for IT systems. This is an example of how 
looking at practices in other sectors may help uncover improvements that can be 
used in other sectors such as the energy sector.  
  
Physical security is an essential part that proves to be a critical element in 
maintaining the security of the Energy sector (Weingart, H. 2000). The location of 
Data centers and distribution sites could prove sensitive and will require protection. 
Bailey, Maruyama, & Wallace (2020) stat that  
 “Access panels for wind turbines are sometimes left unsecured, allowing attackers 
physical access to both internal device controls and a segment of the broader OT 
(Operational Technology) network. Recent security research at a wind-turbine 
farm indicated that physical vulnerabilities (an easily picked lock) and a lack of 
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network security allowed researchers to traverse the entire wind farm’s network 
within minutes—with access privileges that would have enabled them to cause 
anywhere from $10,000 to $30,000 of revenue losses per hour or even destroy the 
turbines entirely.” 
Maintaining security is not just performed on a company level but on a national level 
as well, where different priorities can provide great benefits to maintain security and 
resilience such as the priorities stated in Nickolov (2006).   
“1. Establishing a national cyberspace security response system.  
2. Developing a national cyberspace security threat and vulnerability reduction 
program.  
3. Creating a national cyberspace security awareness and training program.  
4. Securing government systems.  
5. Strengthening national security and international cooperation on cybersecurity.”  
  
3.0 Research Approach  
The objective of this study is to investigate and gain a better understanding of what 
characterizes resilience in CIS within the energy sector, how to achieve resilience in 
this area, and how organizations manage to increase awareness of their employees. 
To address that, the study introduced the following two research questions:  
  
• RQ1: What are the characteristics of resilient critical infrastructures within 
the energy sector, and how can this be achieved?  
• RQ2: What are the best practices used to achieve resilience within the energy 
sector, and how are they carried out to increase the awareness of their 
employees?  
  
This chapter represents the chosen research approach for the thesis which is shown 
in figure 7 and illustrates how the process of doing research and creating research 
questions goes through several steps of research progress. The first step is to design 
an interview protocol, based on research questions, and identify what question needs 
to be asked to potentially answer the research question. The next step is data 
collection where information gathered from interviews is used to provide data. 
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Which moves into the last step, where data analysis is performed, and where 
potential answers to the research question can be discovered.   
We will consider any ethical or validity issues during each step.  
 
Figure 7: Research Process based on Thomas (2006), Cruzes & Dybå (2011), Berg et al. (2020), Andersen & 
Pettersen (2020). 
3.1 Qualitative approach  
The term qualitative research can be used in many forms of methods or techniques, 
each with its own benefits or challenges. It does however have a common goal, and 
that is to explore and examine a person's experience in detail, using different 
methods to achieve this. This method could be interviews, observation, content 
analysis, biographies, focus group discussion or visual method. (Hennink, M., 
Hutter, I., & Bailey, A. 2020).   
Taking a few examples on how to achieve qualitative information we can use 
interview, where conducting an interview with an employee within the energy sector 
related to the power grid. The interview subject can provide experience, personal 
opinion and information regarding power grids and problems that can occur, and 
what they do to prevent it or what they lack in order to mitigate it.  
Another method could be observation, where you follow a person around their work 
environment without interacting with the employee, gathering information by 
looking and listening, allowing them to collect data as it is happening rather than 
through someone else's opinion or emotions (Kolb, 2008). 
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3.2 Quantitative approach  
When using a quantitative approach to gather information, there are some methods 
that could be used in this research, such as data analysis or desk research. While both 
methods are similar in that they both take a lot of raw data and analyze it, there are 
some differences in the two methods. The data analysis would consist of Strengths, 
Weakness, Opportunities, and Threat analysis (SWOT), where the goal would be to 
get a better understanding of power grids and information to use in this report 
(Tugrul 2016). The desk research is simple to look at the information that is out 
there, such as data on the internet and government/non-government sources. 
(Quantitative Research: Definition, Methods, Types and Examples)  
While a quantitative approach is good for collecting substantial amounts of data, it 
can as well be a challenge in itself. How much data do you need to consider it viable, 
if using questionnaires, how many participants is enough, and can you still use it if 
the amount is smaller than you expected?  
3.2.1 Qualitative VS Quantitative  
In the book “Qualitative Research Methods” written by Hennink et al. in 2020, they 
state that the following difference between qualitative and quantitative research can 
be summed up by following some key differences.  
 
Table 8: Qualitative VS Quantitative aspects (Hennink et al. 2020) 
 Qualitative research Quantitative research  




To quantify data and 
extrapolate results to a 
broader population. 
Purpose To understand why? 
How? What is the 
process? What are the 
influence or context? 
To measure, count or 
quantify a problem. To 
answer: How much? 
How often? What 
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proportion? Which 
variables are correlated? 
Data Data are words (called 
textual data) 
Data are numbers (called 
statistical data) 












opinion polls, exit 
interviews. 
Analysis Analysis is interpretive. Analysis is statistical. 
Outcome To develop an initial 
understanding, to 
identify and explain 
behavior, beliefs or 
action. 
To identify prevalence, 
averages and patterns in 
data, To generalize to a 
broader population. 
These key differences can further validate our choices for the selected method we 
choose, by looking at what type of information we want, and what method can 
provide it.   
3.3 Research design   
Depending on the information needed to provide knowledge to the research 
question, a method should be considered to best provide this information. The goal 
of this study is to find out about resilience in the energy sector, practices used to 
implement it, and how this can increase awareness among employees. As shown in 
sections 3.2.1 the various aspects of qualitative and quantitative, this helps us 
determine which method is best to get the information needed to find a potential 
answer to our research question. In this case we look to identify what information 
exists that can be used to improve certain aspects of the energy sector, and the 
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behavior of people towards these improvements. The method chosen for doing the 
research will be performed through qualitative methods, as we seek to investigate 
how people respond to new events that could affect their daily routine.  
“Qualitative research is the systematic inquiry into social phenomena in natural 
setting” Teherani, A. et al. (2015).   
These phenomena can be about people's experiences, how an individual or a group 
behaves, and how the organizations function. The research allows for the 
examination of what happens, how it occurs, and what these are meant to the people 
involved. Teherani, A. et al. (2015). Using qualitative data, we can learn more, and 
better describe the phenomenon, by providing a more detailed insight to the 
participant, and the world they experience. Hoepfl, M. C. (1997).  
Thus, using a qualitative interview is considered both the most common and 
important method for gathering data. Myers, M. D., & Newman, M. (2007).  
When it comes to the purpose of the research Robson classified four diverse types 
(Berg et al., 2020; Robson, 2002):  
● Exploratory - Understanding what is happening: to seek new insight.  
● Descriptive - Portraying a situation or phenomenon.  
● Explanatory - Seeking an explanation of a situation or a problem, mostly 
but not necessary in the form of a causal relationship.  
● Improving - Try to improve an aspect of the studied phenomenon.   
  
In this research work, the context of our interviews, and the goal of our research is to 
look at potential factors that can help increase resilience within the energy sector.   
The result is that this is an exploratory study.   
 
3.4 Research subject Selection  
Subjects were collected primarily through NC-Spectrum who worked as a medium 
between us and other organizations, a minor few were contacted directly by us. We 
provided NC-Spectrum with a brief list of criteria of the type of informant we were 
after, as well as a maximum number of respondents per organization.   
The people we contacted and interviewed were limited to three members of the 
organizations and had to fulfil one of the three different categories.  
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1. They have some sort of leadership role within the organization.  
2. They have some sort of responsibility for IT and Cybersecurity.   
3. They have other responsibilities within the organization where 
IT/Cybersecurity is less of a priority.  
  
several organizations were contacted about being interviewed for this study. We 
managed to get 7 different organizations that were willing to be interviewed. The pie 
chart shows the general fields the organizations work inn. Several of the 
organizations do function in more than on field. 
 
Figure 8: Organizations fields 
Table 9 shows the general profession of our 11 respondents that fulfill the criteria and 
area that they are representing.  
However, to ensure that the informant to be anonyms the category “Area” of the table 
below, is a looser description of their job area, Therefore the “Area” represents a 
“sum up” part of their work. Our informant was divided among who had more 
technical background, and those who had a more organizational background, while 
this is a particularly good balance, this has also led to some questions were not or 
insufficiently answered due to lack of knowledge in the specific questioning, 
depending on background.  
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Table 9: Interview’s object 
ID Profession Area 
1 Leadership IT security 
2 Leadership IKT 
3 Leadership IKT 
4 Leadership IKT  
5 IT/Cybersecurity IT security 
6 Leadership IT security  
7 IT/Cybersecurity  IKT 
8 IT/Cybersecurity  Consulting 
9 Leadership IKT 
10 Leadership IKT 
11 IT/Cybersecurity  Consulting 
 
We were determined from the beginning to ensure anonymity to our respondents as 
well as the organizations we contacted. The reasons for this are that we investigate 
sensitive areas of the organization, and we also investigate what aspects of certain 
security or resilience practices do not work or function optimally within the 
organizations. Therefore, anonymization was of high priority to us, to ensure that our 
respondents were comfortable answering as honestly as they could without negative 
consequences.   
3.5 Data collection   
When it comes to qualitative interview questions there are three different forms of 
interviews one uses to gather information. Structured, unstructured, and semi-
structured interviews.  
Different types of methods have their advantages and disadvantages, depending on 
what you are after concerning information.  
  
Structured interviews are when the questions are planned and non-deviant, the 
interviewer all asks the same question in the same order, and the interviewee must 
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answer just the question. This is usually what is used in job interviews when you are 
comparing the different interviewees with each other (Myers, 2007). 
  
Unstructured interviews are the opposite of structured interviews where the 
questions are not planned. This results in more open and spontaneous questions, 
and different interviewees may get different questions. This is a more personal 
approach, and the interviewee can answer freely. This method is good to get 
experience from an individual (Myers, 2007). 
  
Semi-structured Interviews are a combination of the other two, where a few pre-
made, questions are asked to get the interview going, but interviewers can ask off-
scripted questions, and the interviewee are free to answer as they please (Myers, 
2007). 
3.5.1 Semi-Structured Interviews  
Geoff Walsham, (2006) mentions that interviews are used very commonly in most 
studies and are an essential technique for gathering data. While both unstructured 
and semi-structure are a variable method for conducting interviews in our research, 
this study has chosen to use semi-structure to both have the possibility to ask about 
existing issues, and solutions, as well as still having an open interview where we can 
learn more about the employee personal experience. In addition, a semi structured 
interview will have a list of questions but the sequence of asking those questions is 
flexible. This could lead to us having the opportunity to talk or ask about other 
subjects that are related to the study and could create other categories that might 
assist in broadening the analysis. If you do not slip out in relation to the topic and 
time you have available, this is entirely possible in this form of interview (Myers & 
Newman, 2007). Furthermore, Semi-structured interviews could allow researchers to 
understand how individuals interact and react to their context, but reduce the risk of 
bias as well (Iyamu, 2018; Tsan, 2014; Marshall et al 2015). Another reason this 
method was preferred was that we needed to define some questions that could be 
used to further understand our knowledge about the area of interest and to confirm 
or disconfirm some aspect about our research problem. In addition, using the semi-
structure method allows us to learn more about the interviewee's own experience, 
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opinions, and perception and how they viewed the work tasks. Furthermore, a semi-
structured enables the respondents to speak in a free form and then later we can ask 
for more specific details, where we feel that a more concrete answer is required. 
Having this form of qualitative approach will increase the amount of information we 
could get that could help answer our research question.  
  
In order to ensure this procedure was accomplished correctly, we decided to follow a 
review paper “Systematic methodological review: developing a framework for a 
qualitative semi-structured interview guide” by Kallio et al. (2016) on how to set up 
an interview guide using semi-structured interview.   
 
Figure 9: Framework for development of a qualitative semi-structured interview guide (Kallio et al. 2016) 
By following a developed framework, we can further justify how and why we use our 
method and ensure that our interview questions are relevant to the research 
questions.  
Several of these goals have been met previously within this paper, and we intend to 
follow this guide as closely as possible, however considering work and time limits 
some aspects may not be able to be completed or used within this paper. These 
limitations were mostly on refining the research questions and having some testing 
to see how well formulated they were for a potential research subject.  
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The interview will open with a brief introduction to what we are trying to accomplish 
here, and then inform the respondents about data processing and consent (See 
Appendix 4: Consent Form). We made the questions both in English (shown below) 
and Norwegian (Appendix 1: Interview questions in Norwegian). Which one will be 
used will be decided by what the respondent is most comfortable with? The following 
questionnaire was used for the data collection procedure.  
 
 The semi-structured interview will allow us to ask follow-up questions at each phase 
about anything we might find relevant to the study or if we identify something that 
needs to be explained in detail. We decided to have both researchers in each 
interview due to the following reasons:  
1. enables direct contact with the respondents.  
2. creates a demanding first-degree data collection technique.   
3. one of the researchers could produce a relevant question the other did not 
think of (Runeson & Höst, 2008).  
  
Lastly all interviews have been recorded and transcribed so that we can provide data 
for the analysis stage.  
3.6 Limitations of interviews  
When using interviews regardless of form and structure there are some limitations 
that can affect the outcome. There is also a possibility that differences in social and 
cultural understanding can shape the interview. (Fontana and Frey, 2000) Myers & 
Newman point out that there are several other aspects that could become potential 
problems when conducting interviews such as (Myers & Newman, 2007):  
  
● Lack of trust - when an interviewer is a stranger, and the interviewee may 
have doubts about how much they can trust the interviewer and may not 
want to give out certain information they consider sensitive, which can 
lead to the data gathering being incomplete.  
 
● Constructing knowledge - interviewers may think that they just absorb the 
data or information that is already there and may not realize that they are 
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actively constructing knowledge. (Fontana and Frey, 2000) This can 
happen when an interviewee responds to a question, they never have 
considered before, and reflect on the issue, while the interviewer takes this 
reflection and makes it into something that is logical and consistent, but 
not what the interviewee reflected on. 
●  Ambiguity of language - words can often be ambiguous, and what the 
interviewer asks, may not be what the interviewee hears, and vice versa, as 
such misunderstanding can occur during an interview. (Fontana and Frey, 
2000)   
  
● Specific targets, that may be limited in number and availability for 
interview, such as having a specific group, in a certain area, where not all 
may be valid for interview.   
In our research work we interview members within CIS, therefor there may 
be a limited number on how many interviews object that are willing to 
share experience with us.  
  
Using qualitative methods can be an extremely useful tool for gathering data but 
understanding the limitations and pitfalls of using such interviews is important to be 
able to use it to its full potential. (Myers & Newman, 2007) When we go forth with 
the interviews these limitations and others such as the Hawthorne effect or elite bias 
are necessary to be aware of, to best avoid them.  
   
“The qualitative interview is a powerful tool, but those using it should have an 
appreciation of its strengths and weaknesses.” (Myers & Newman, 2007, p5)  
 
The limitation above was analyzed and together with the supervisors found ways to 
deal with them. To build trust between the interviewer and the subject, an interview 
guide and consent form were created and handed to every subject. The guide and 
consent form gave the subjects information on how any data given then will be 
handled, stored, and deleted. In addition, everything they said will be anonyms and 
cannot be tracked back to them. The interview subjects then knew what they were 
signing for and had time to prepare for these interviews. To avoid misunderstanding 
both interviewers and interviewees agreed on that, anything that is not 
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understandable should be highlighted to make sure there are no misunderstandings. 
In addition, there were two interviewers in every interview to make sure that if there 
were any misunderstanding, one of the interviewers would notice it. Lastly, the 
specific targets were our biggest concern due to covid 19 and the number of targets 
available for interviews. This was addressed by asking NC-spectrum and our 
supervisors to assist with finding the specific subjects we could interview. However, 
this limitation was not addressed to a satisfactory level, seeing how we managed to 
have 11 interviews when the goal was to conduct 15. 
3.7 Data analysis  
This study looked at a variety of data and analyzed them structurally. The analysis 
was based on interviews, where we wrote down notes during the meeting, as well as 
going through the recording of the interview and transcribing for further analysis. In 
addition, the analysis of result data was performed in an inductive approach where 
we had decided to explicitly use the form of thematic analysis (Thomas, 2006). A 
general inductive analysis approach contains three objectives (Thomas, 2006)  
  
1. Summary format is created from raw data.  
2. Text is familiarized with, and an understanding of themes and events is 
gained.  
3. Create categories that can be subdivided into new categories/themes 
each with its own segment of data.  
  
Thomas, (2006) mentions that there are some fundamentals to how a general 
inductive approach is carried out. The analysis starts by having evaluation objectives 
guiding it, however having multiple readings that interprets the raw data will satisfy 
the inductive component. Focus will then be provided by the objectives, but no 
expectations about findings. Additionally, the researcher will then develop a model 
containing themes and processes which is taken from categorizing the raw data. 
Later, the findings will then be framed from the researcher’s perspective, by arriving 
at results from the several interpretations that have been finished. That is when 
decisions will be taken from the researcher about the importance of inadequacy of 
the data. Furthermore, the researchers could end up with findings that are distinct 
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and not overlapping each other. Lastly Thomas, (2006), mentions that the 
trustworthiness of this type of analysis evolves from other qualitative analysis.  
  
The combination of inductive approach with the thematic analysis will attempt to 
answer our research questions by providing a model of themes and events that will 
describe what characterizes resilience in CIS and how do they achieve it. The NVivo 
software given to use by the university will assist in analyzing and coding the data we 
will gather. An explanation of the analysis procedure is shown below.  
  
Initial reading:  
We will start by having the raw data files cleaned up, and then start reading it so that 
we can find patterns and get some general ideas. In addition, during the interviews 
one of the researchers (us) will be taking notes that might help during the initial 
reading phase.  
  
Coding Process:   
We plotted our transcriptions from the interview into NVivo, from there we could 
code each section of the interviews with the corresponding answer from all 
respondents to that section. Through this process we could compare similarities and 
differences of each informant to the related interview question.   
  
Coding into themes:  
After that we coded our transcriptions, we started to code into themes to avoid 
having to use terms that were too general. This made it easier to find specific phrases 
or keywords to further clarify what our respondents had said.  
 
Translation 
The interviews were conducted in Norwegian with all respondents, The information 
gathered from this interview were then translated into English. The quotes are 
translated to be accurate conveyed from Norwegian to English.  
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3.8 Validity   
When it comes to qualitative research validity, usually the researchers refer to 
qualitative research that is plausible, credible, trustworthy, and defensible. Johnson 
(1997).  Stated, “We believe it is important to think about the issue of validity in 
qualitative research and to examine some strategies that have been developed to 
maximize validity” (pg. 282). For our study to be trusted the validity of it must be 
considered, which is why we decided to use the qualitative research validity of 
Johnson (1997). There are several strategies that can be used in qualitative research 
validity such as extended fieldwork, triangulation, reflexivity which is shown in table 
10. 
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Table 10: Strategies used to promote qualitative research validity (Johnson, 1997) 
 
Our goal here is to combine several strategies mentioned such as reflexivity and data 
triangulation, where the researchers will focus on self-awareness, “critical self-
reflection” and control biases while using multiple data sources to help understand a 
phenomenon. Johnson (1997) describes how researchers must be careful and beware 
of one potential threat that is called researcher bias. This was mentioned to him by a 
colleague of his where she stated, “the problem with qualitative research is that the 
researchers find what they want to find, and then they write up with their results” 
(Johnson 1997 pg. 283). Therefore, it is essential for this study that the mentioned 
strategies are performed and include a peer review as the last strategy where 
interpretations and conclusions of the researchers will be discussed with others. The 
supervisors that follow the researchers during the semester will play the “devil’s 
advocate” role where they challenge the researchers to provide solid evidence for 
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their interpretations or conclusions. This will help in gaining useful insights where it 
is relevant. In addition to the strategies chosen the study will assess the five main 
validity types: Descriptive, interpretive, theoretical, internal, and external validity 
that Johnson (1997) mentions in his paper which goes as follows.  
  
● Descriptive validity: refers to the accuracy of the information that is 
reported. We start by having one researcher taking notes which later will 
be compared with the transcriptions. Additionally, we decided to use 
investigator triangulation where multiple observers will be attending the 
interviews so that they could cross-check observations and make sure the 
interviewer and the respondents are on the same page.  
  
● Interpretive validity: refers to which degree the respondents' thoughts, 
feelings, intentions, experience, and the researchers understand 
viewpoints. Here is where we attempt to get inside the heads of the 
respondents to gain an understanding of what they see and feel.   
  
● Theoretical validity: Is to validate through theoretical explanation form 
where the research fits the data. One should also look at cases that do not 
fit the explanation, to ensure that all aspects are investigated to ensure 
credibility. This research work performs it by looking at prior research and 
verifying our findings against them.   
  
● Internal validity: By looking at cause and effect and their relationship a 
researcher can study how certain processes function/develop. The validity 
comes from looking at a phenomenon and investigating all potential 
reasons why it occurs and ruling out any other rival explanation. Thus, 
looking at if the causal factor occurs, does then the effect follow, and make 
sure that there are no other variables that are the reasons for the 
relationship.   
  
● External validity: The primary goal of external validity is to generalize the 
information gathered from research, to make the information easy to 
replicate the research study, by providing certain information such as 
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number and type of people, selection method, relationship between 
researcher and participant etc. The more information about how the data 
was gathered, makes this easier to replicate.   
 
3.9 Ethical Considerations  
As mentioned, dealing with critical infrastructure, and gathering information about 
this can lead to findings that could be considered confidential by the companies we 
are investigating. After a thorough discussion with our supervisors and clients, it was 
decided that this study does gather sensitive data. Every interviewer was informed 
about their right to revoking their consent that could happen at any time. 
Additionally, we decided to look at what type of data was gathered from the 
interviews and once the analysis and findings have been written, the respondents 
would get a copy where they could read it and give their consent before it is 
published. Additionally, the researchers have been provided encrypted and safe 
cloud storage by the University of Agder to store all the interview recordings and 
transcripts. Another factor we had to consider was the Covid-19 pandemic that still is 
afflicting the country, which led to having physical interviews being canceled. It has 
been made clear by the professors that the GDPR legislation usually requires the 
interviews to be conducted in a physical and offline environment where the device 
used to record the interviews must not have any network connectivity. However, the 
social distancing rules and the fact that most people have home offices for the time 
being forced us to find other solutions. Therefore, the interviews had to be conducted 
through the internet in the form of online interviews. Both Zoom and Microsoft 
team’s platform were used to carry out the interviews, as we have experience pre 
hand using these tools. In addition, some respondents from past experiences were 
more comfortable/known to use one of these tools, therefore we decided to provide 
the option of using both. The software's comes with encryption technologies and is 
safe to use for our data collection.  
4.0 Empirical Findings  
The empirical findings have been categorized and presented based on the structure 
of the literature review and the structure used for the interviews, as shown in Figure 
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10. The coding of all interviews followed the same structure, and the results are 
presented as sub-categories.  
 
Figure 10: Resilience in critical infrastructure within the energy sector 
4.1 Security Findings  
Our goal of the security findings was to investigate what threats and challenges exist 
for the energy sector and what were the typical measurements used to counter these 
potential issues. All 11 respondents were at some level involved with security, either 
directly or as part of their role in the organization.   
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These sections are divided into four subcategories and provide some in-depth 
information about the key factors, as perceived by how the respondents viewed 
threats or challenges to their organization, and the energy sector. These 
subcategories aim to see what the common aspect between the respondents is, and 
what differs between them.  
 
Figure 11: Security within the energy sector 
4.1.1 Threats  
All our respondents were familiar with the types of threats that exist within the 
energy sector and most of these respondents worked within that area to prevent 
these threats from causing unwanted damage to their systems. The majority of those 
who responded mentioned that the CIS and the energy sector are facing many 
different threats today and the outcome of these threats varies, however they all need 
to be addressed.  
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9 out of the 11 respondents mentioned that the energy sector in Norway uses a 
system called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) to monitor and 
control their infrastructure. One of the threats they have is the connection of 
different systems that they call SCADA systems. The parts of those systems where the 
functionality is easy and very straightforward are called easy S systems, other parts of 
the systems are more difficult to operate based on how old they are. This creates an 
unwanted threat for the energy sector where they must build security for both 
systems. I7 & I8 also mentioned that the critical systems they have are isolated from 
the outside world and adding direct updates to a SCADA system are difficult and 
require more than just stopping and restarting the servers. In addition, if someone 
gains access to this system, they could start manipulating data in the system and 
affect the power plants in a harmful way, among others by increasing the voltage 
while everything looks fine in the control room. Furthermore, 5 out 11 specified that 
other threats have emerged and made the energy sector a target due to the following 
reasons:  
1. The energy sector operates with a lot of power-sensitive and valuable 
information.  
2. They have personal-sensitive information that contains customer data.  
3. Having unauthorized people gaining access to systems will jeopardize the 
integrity of both their system and the deliverance of energy.  
  
When asked about the other threats, I1 and I5 focused on both traffic monitoring and 
state-sponsored threats. It was mentioned that traffic monitoring of the data moving 
in between the endpoint and into the systems is important to secure. Unauthorized 
persons cannot have access to, or any control over this data, because if it is read there 
is room for printing. Room for printing could let them manipulate the data which 
could have significant consequences for the national infrastructure. The ability to 
deliver is a threat that was mentioned by several respondents. The energy sector 
relies on other organizations to deliver software and hardware components to them. 
I2 and I3 spoke about how the energy sector’s ability to deliver could be accidentally 
or intentionally affected by the components they get and use. While the chances of 
that happening are small it is still a critical vulnerability that they need to address. 
Security roles and insider attack is described by four of our respondents as a typical 
threat the energy sector is concerned about.  
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Employees capable of performing a malicious attack can easily do this when they 
have authorized access and broad knowledge of the system’s architecture and 
policies/procedures. 
Out of the 11 respondents, 10 of them mentioned the most common threats the 
energy sector faces are ransomware and phishing. According to I1, various threat 
actors attempt at installing ransomware and other types of viruses or scripts to gain 
access to exploit the system, threat actors then ask for ransom or simply destroy or 
manipulate data. Moreover, it was explained that these threats such as phishing 
attacks are not aimed at certain people, but at the whole organization itself. I5 
explained.  
   “They are looking for general attacks and just spam the employees with phishing 
emails and see if someone falls for the trap. However, what we are most concerned 
about is that we get exposed to ransomware. Knowing that if we become a victim of 
ransomware, the recovery from that is possible, but will be challenging regardless 
of the amount of training and security measurements we take.”   
The threat profile in the energy sector is getting more complex and tougher to 
manage. 5 out 11 explained that criminal organizations, cyber espionage, insider 
attacks, and state-sponsored actors are constantly trying to infiltrate their systems by 
using different methods and tools to stay ahead of the curve, which in return makes it 
difficult for organizations in Norway to keep up.  
4.1.2 Challenges  
When it comes to challenges, 5 out 11 have experienced that getting economic focus 
on getting the right tools and resources to protect their systems is inadequate, due to 
management’s lack of interest and knowledge of cybersecurity. The energy sector has 
policies and procedures just like any other organization, and I10 referred to getting 
employees to understand and follow these policies are a challenge. Another challenge 
the energy sector faces today is how they can relate to legislation provided to them. 
I5 mentioned that the legislation could be interpreted in separate ways and in some 
cases, it is very general. Using a combination of legislation and other policies does 
help, however, it does not completely address the challenges. I6 further added that 
these policies sometimes are unknown to the employees or otherwise not followed as 
they should be.  
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One of the biggest challenges in the energy sector is digitalization. 7 of the 
respondents mentioned that digitalization is one of the main goals in the energy 
sector today. The demands for digitalization and making the systems more available 
are increasing.  
I1 explained “I want to say that at the same time as digitalization is fantastically 
exciting and that makes us move forward, it is digitalization that is the challenge. It 
goes incredibly fast and with that, safety must be increased. It may be that we are a 
bit behind and then there is also the fact that the threat actors are lightning fast to 
develop which demands organizations to be more robust and be more resilient to be 
able to either resist or handle incidents.”  
4.1.3 Addressing Threats and Challenges   
When it comes to how the organizations, in this study, address their security 3 out of 
11 explicitly mention they use “kraftberedskapsforskriften4” (KBF) and another 2 out 
of 11 mention it indirectly. The term “kraftberedskapsforskriften” is something that 
all our respondents have confirmed to use in their organization. They talked about 
how the KBF provides guidelines that can be followed to best handle security 
challenges.   
7 out of 11 talks about the different technical measurements such as Intrusion 
detection system (IDS) or having some e-mail filter or having secured the traffic of 
information with encryption.  
All respondents mentioned the use of third-party organizations such as KraftCERT 
or NVE to assist them in alerting and monitoring their traffic or data.  
A recurrent theme in the interviews was a sense amongst interviewees that most of 
the organizations do believe they have a decent or proficient level of measurement, 
and there is a high trust factor towards these third parties to be a beneficial impact. 
Based on the information gathered from the respondents, there are some consistent 
similarities of tools used between them to ensure measurements. Such as aid from 
third parties and the use of technical solutions like monitoring to help address 
security challenges.  
 
4 the power contingency regulations 
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4.1.4 Management  
When it came to the organizational aspect of their organization and what they do to 
maintain or increase security 6 out of 11 talked about implementing training for their 
employee, and communication within the organization to manage and maintain the 
security of the organization. I9 and I10 mentioned that hiring people or consultants 
to provide the necessary competence is one of the things they do to ensure they are 
on the right track. This indicates that having people with an understanding of 
security and what to look for of potential threats is a high priority to many of our 
respondents and their organization. I3, I4 and I5 talked more about making sure that 
the network, system, firewall, etc. was able to provide the security needed to avoid 
any potential threats, by limiting unnecessary access of employee, having some 
restricting on login to system, making sure that people who should not have access to 
sensitive information does not get it to mention some. In addition, I1 and I8 further 
mentioned use of third-party organizations, to assist in following up the organization 
and to assist in making sure that they get the supervision they need to maintain 
security.  
Two discrete themes emerged in our interview group, whether you change the people 
to improve the system or change the system to improve people. This is expected to be 
about the background of our respondents, rather than a reflection on the 
organization whole.   
  
When it comes to the technical aspect 7 out of 11 informed that there is a great focus 
on IDS detection and firewall to check for unwanted events, where some of the 
employees use the system or login incorrectly an alert is triggered and reported. 
Thus, even if many of these are false positive, they do show that the system can 
detect them.  
Three respondents, I1, I8 and I11 mentioned that using or contacting third party 
organizations to assist in the technical aspect was beneficial, by helping with 
monitoring, logs or uncovering potential solutions.   
  
When it comes to what the informant believed was the most beneficial 
countermeasures I2 and I4 talked about segregation of the system. Where the 
different systems do not have the same access to certain key switches, or sensitive 
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information and to make it tougher for an attack program to shut down everything. 
There was a higher number of respondents who credit technical solutions as the most 
beneficial countermeasures as well. 5 out 11 talked about surveillance, such as 
monitoring, logs, or tracking, and that having these implemented proved to be an 
effective way of checking if the system worked, and that events were caught and 
handled. For 4 out 11 the most important aspect was raising awareness among 
employees, teaching them that what they do, can impact the organization, and 
teaching them to be more alert and notify security personnel if something happens.  
  
While there was an inconsistency with what were the most important key beneficial 
implementation, a majority (8 out of 11) mentioned to a varying degree, that 
ensuring an understanding of and teaching security to people or employees because 
people are considered one the biggest security threats to the organization.  
4.2 Framework   
The goal for inquiring about the framework and which was used was to see if there 
was a consistency of what framework was used within the energy sector, and if it 
were the same as in other countries or places.  
During the interviews it was discovered that 5 of 11 of our respondents had limited 
understanding of their frameworks and what it did, because some could only provide 
surface information in their answering. Another finding was the lack of knowledge 
about NIST and its usages among our respondents. However, a very few numbers of 
respondents were able to give some information on the possible reasons for the lack 
of knowledge in Norway about NIST.  
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Figure 12: Framework within the energy sector 
4.2.1 Type of framework  
When interviewing the respondents there was a unanimous agreement on what type 
of framework was being used within their organization, as all talked about the KBF 
which is a set of guidelines that an organization follows to ensure that the energy 
sector is secured. The KBF applies to prevention, handling and limiting events that 
could harm this sector. While the KBF seems to be the standard for these 
organizations, it was not the only one used. 6 out of 11 talks about Nasjonal 
sikkerhetsmyndighet 5(NSM) being used with KBF as a tool for framework, and that 
they follow some of NSM guidelines, however I1 and I11 talk about how KBF is based 
 
5 The National Security Authority 
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on NSM and that many principals are the same. The NSM is a national framework 
that works on many different sectors, and KBF while based on NSM, is more targeted 
towards the energy sector. Therefor NSM will have some specific guidelines that are 
not covered in the KBF. KBF have many similarities with NSM, and that is why they 
are both used next to each other, and why some of the informant talks about both as 
if they are one.  
There was some talk about how the organizations are subjected to KBF, and not 
necessarily NSM, where I1, I4 and I6 states that they must follow KBF and that they 
follow the recommendation of NSM, as a supplement to KBF rather than it being a 
requirement.  
4.2.2 NIST  
There was a lack of knowledge about what NIST framework was and what relation it 
had among all our interviews. Only 3 of the 11 respondents knew if NIST were 
practiced in their respected sector. I5 mentioned that they knew about NIST and 
other frameworks, but it was not practiced in their organization. The same informant 
referred to how NVE does not have any limitation on how many frameworks 
organizations within the energy sector can practice. They have listed a few that could 
help with choosing the one that fits the given organization, and NIST is rarely 
chosen. I7 and I11 explained that NIST is practiced in their organization with the help 
of NSM, which has managed to create a Norwegian variant of the NIST framework in 
several areas. The way it works is that the organization itself takes NSM core 
principles and uses the NIST framework as a reference to address threats, challenges, 
security management, risk analysis, etc.  
4.2.2.1 Why is NIST not implemented?  
Several of our respondents were then asked why NIST is not practiced, and they had 
assorted reasons as to why. 5 out 11 referred that KBF have incredibly strict 
frameworks for ICT security. I1 specified that the difference between the legislation 
made for the energy sector are extensive compared to other sectors, and that is one of 
the reasons why their respected sector does not see the need for implementation of 
another framework. In addition, 4 out 11 explained there are areas in the NIST 
framework where the energy sector needs to improve for them to be able to 
implement NIST. The asset and governance category of the function called identity 
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shown in Table 6 of NIST is where the energy sector lacks the desired knowledge and 
control. This makes it harder to introduce a framework such as NIST that is extensive 
and difficult for an organization of their size to implement. I5 explains that NIST is 
very Americanized and the NSM fundamental principles in Norway are written so 
that a person can, hypothetically, read and understand it without having any 
certification. There are also points within the NIST framework that are better suited 
for the segments in dissimilar categories, and therefore some organizations decide to 
combine different frameworks so that it is easier to reach their goal. I5 and I11 
highlighted that NIST mention that being 100% compliant with their framework is 
an impossible task to do, but organizations can become a partner of NIST and seek 
assistance to reach their goal. 
Therefore, several organizations in the energy sector use the framework KBF which 
are believed to be remarkably similar to both the ISO 27002 and NIST framework. 
KBF has the following principles.  
 
1. Identify and map.  
2. Protect and create.  
3. Hold and discover.  
4. Manage and restore.  
  
In addition, several respondents mentioned that the European countries have their 
frameworks made for them and some of them are specially made for Norway, it is 
more natural to use them. However, there were many ideas and thoughts from NIST, 
and other frameworks implemented in the European one.  
4.2.3 Potential improvement  
When interviewing our respondents, we wanted to hear about the framework they 
were using and if it could be improved or if it was lacking in some areas.  
To this question 6 out of 11 did have some perspective on what could be improved to 
make the KBF/NSM better for the organization. 4 out of 6 talked about how further 
adaptation toward the energy sector could help in improving the frameworks. The 
adaptation ranges from making the framework more understandable for people not 
heavily invested in framework and making it less comprehensive. In addition, 
making a lighter version for a smaller organization so they could easier handle the 
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framework. The last 2 of the 6 wanted some improvement on how some of the 
technical aspects are handled in the framework, such as changing some of the rules 
on data storing and network access.  
The rest of the respondents did not know enough about their framework or did not 
know what could be improved about the framework.   
The main potential improvement of KBF or NSM seems to be the same reason NIST 
is not used. That some frameworks can be too complex, or too big to be properly 
implemented in an organization, and making a smaller, easier to handle version, is 
something that certain organizations want. This is naturally easier said than done 
and with the complexity of the ever digitalization of our world, making a light version 
of framework, may not be possible.   
  
As for the NIST framework and what improvements they can make for it to be used 
in Norway, I2 explains that NIST needs to create a custom version which is more 
focused on reality-oriented level. The current one is too detailed, and organizations 
might feel overwhelmed by it. I3 added that the expertise in the field is lacking, and 
organizations in Norway and NVE should focus on increasing the expertise by 
offering courses and certifications for their employees in the bigger organizations at 
the very least. Several respondents mentioned that for Norwegian organizations in 
the energy sector to use NIST or other frameworks, there must be a specific need that 
their given frameworks do not cover or address. So far that has not been a problem.   
4.3 Resilience of the CIS   
During the interview, we looked to see if the term resilience meant the same for all 
respondents or if there were some who understood that term differently. While there 
were some differences in how they explain it, the general understanding of the term 
resilience was similar among our respondents. We additionally discussed how 
respondents viewed resilience within their sector, and 11 out of 11 said that the level 
of resilience is good or above good, however the reasons did vary from informant to 
informant. 4 out of 11 give credit to technical reasoning for satisfactory level of 
resilience, and another 4 out 11 give credit to improved security teaching to employee 
and understanding of threats and what to do or who to contact, as their reasons for 
why resilience in the energy sector is good. I7 and I8 consider resilience as something 
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that is for the entire organization, and only when everything is taken into 
consideration, can you know if what you have is resilient or not.  
 
Figure 13: Resilience within the energy sector 
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4.3.1 Achieving resilience.  
When asked how the energy sector achieves and maintains its resilience throughout 
the years. Several respondents specified that there are diverse ways of achieving 
resilience and it is a combination of procedures/actions taken that makes achieving 
resilience possible. These procedures/actions are both on an organizational and 
technical level.  
  
Several of our respondents mentioned that to achieve resilience on the organizational 
level, there are some factors that the organizations within the energy sector need to 
address. This part of resilience is about having effective communication, 
understanding the picture, and knowing what is needed.   
The first thing our respondents focused on is having the right competence, and that 
expertise is available to solve problems when needed. To make that work I3 
mentioned that they need to have a minimum of 3 personnel who can do an 
operational role, and they must be able to have one man on holiday and one man ill 
and at least one man left. They are also in the process of moving it in the direction of 
having 5 personnel available to see how the work requirement has increased. 
Moreover, I9 and I11 explained that all the expertise and knowledge they have is 
shared between the companies in the industry and that NVE publishes a lot of 
information to inform about the threat picture and it is quite useful for them. In 
addition, the management is more involved as well when it comes to being resilient. 
NVE and NSM are helping the organization from top to bottom by showing them 
what types of threats exist out there and how to identify and mitigate them. I1, I3, 
and I5 highlighted that NVE has created several requirements that need to be 
followed by them.  
Lastly I1, I6, and I9 mentioned that resilience on the organizational level is about 
following policies and effort plans that are created to help with how to do things. 
These policies include exercises that they have gone through to get the mindset of 
what to do in different situations, classification of emergency preparedness, and 
contacting the right people for IT security assistance. Therefore, to summarize it is 
about documentation and those who are involved in the organization are included 
and have had the proper training and overview of their systems which is mentioned 
later in the report.  
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As for the technical level of resilience, the respondents emphasized that having the 
correct tools and solution is a big part of becoming resilient. To get that, the 
organizations address IT security, and they rely on assessments made by experts 
within the field. Then a presentation will be made for why this system/solution is 
needed and how it could help with security/resilience. Then a conclusion will be 
made whether this system will be implemented or not. According to 4 out of 11 the 
conclusion usually results in getting the solution they need. I5 additionally 
mentioned that having temporary solutions with a physical contingency plan where 
they store them in two separate places is another way of achieving resilience. This 
may count both as an organizational and technical level of resilience, however, that 
means the solution provided would cover the technical side if they were attacked.  
  
Another highlight that was mentioned by several respondents is the energy systems 
in Norway are built differently than other countries/nations. Whereas other 
countries have large nuclear and gas power plants, and if one or two of them are 
attacked/malfunctioning it would have a significant effect on society. Norway has 
their power plants built with very many producing units, if some of them are attacked 
or not working properly, it is not critical for the delivery of power. I3 explains.   
  “The power plant is also built to be self-propelled, at least the big ones. There has 
always been a culture in the industry for building solutions with both seat belts and 
seat belt braces, rescue services parachute all measures that the power plant should 
be able to operate on its own.”  
  
The energy sector in Norway is occupied with the structure of their security as well. 
I6 explains that security is built layer by layer. The backup systems built are optimal 
and have been tested. The traffic they use is safe and encrypted. The architecture of 
how the systems control, connection to the outside world, and monitoring traffic is of 
most importance to them. According to I10 resilience within the energy sector is 
technically built in the form of perimeter protection with firewalls, and a detection 
mechanism such as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). There must be a balance 
between security, accessibility, usability, and economy. Achieving proper resilience is 
about creating that balance. I7 and I11 added that the technical part of resilience is 
about having solutions that increase their security by doing the following:  
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1. Measure the number of clients.   
2. Send notifications to make employees aware of unpatched things.  
3. Who has administrator rights (security roles)?  
4. How many incidents/events do they get related to users (human error)  
  
Several respondents highlighted that Resilience in the energy sector is achieved 
through having an overview of the system. Recognition of where one is weak, and 
strong. To put in countermeasures to address and secure the weakest links. The 
overview of lines and the production channels in the energy sector is quite fast, 
therefore organizations will have the ability to respond and get their systems back 
online quickly.  
4.3.2 Challenges  
Understanding what challenges can occur within the energy sector was of great 
interest to us, as it gave some clue to what can affect the energy sector in a negative 
way. In this area most of our respondents had several topics they believed to be the 
biggest challenges that could affect the resilience of the energy sector.  
  
 4 respondents believe that the energy sector's ability to keep up with newer and 
more advanced threats is an issue that is always there, and difficult to get ahead of.  
I7 and I10 talked about how having modern technology could mitigate some of the 
challenges, by getting the newest digital solution where it is possible, would be the 
most important part in ensuring security. However, in contrast, 1 of the respondents 
was concerned about getting a new system worth million and where no one in the 
organization knew how to really use it, making it a waste of time and money.  
But the biggest challenge that most of our respondents agreed upon was the 
competence of employees. 7 out of 11 says that it is a challenge to ensure that people 
have some level of understanding and competence when it comes to security. Such as 
making people aware of what they do and the consequences of it or making sure they 
do not make mistakes or fail to follow security routines. This was additionally 
pointed out about the importance of having the management and other leaders 
involved in understanding why doing certain things, or acquiring a certain security 
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system is important, for the continuation of their product, in this case supplying 
energy.  
4.3.2.1 Bottlenecks   
We further discussed with our respondents if there was a bottleneck area that could 
be potential challenging to resilience, that they could think of. And to this there was 
no real unity to the answers among our respondents and they were mostly individual, 
or already mentioned before.   
  
I1 and I11 both discussed the challenges of getting the management to acquire 
different technical or equivalent items that could prove beneficial to the 
organizations. While they both say that some improvements have been made in this 
area, there are still some bottleneck issues there. I2, I5, I6 and I10 did have some 
concern about different technical issues, such as how security is built around this 
system, having control over what these systems do, or having detection in all stages 
or physical limitation, that influences how the technical aspect can operate.   
4.3.3 Practices & goals  
The respondents were asked about whether they have some form of practice and goal 
they used to increase the security or resilience in their sector.   
5 out of 11 respondents say they have some practices about how to ensure that they 
follow the KBF, as well as some of these respondents additionally had some more 
individual strategy that they believed was an improvement to be in line with the KBF.  
4 out of 11 mention that using third party members as a tool to either share expertise 
among organizations, being notified from third parties when there have been 
incidents, and vice versa, to be better prepared, these third-party members were 
organization such as KraftCERT, NC-spectrum and NSM.  
Using another third party is a practice to help improve the resilience of some of these 
organizations. Only 1 of the respondents talk about being more independent and not 
so reliant on others, to minimize the number of entries points a threat actor can use 
from other organizations.   
4 respondents talked about the use of technical solutions that they wanted to add, 
implement, or improve to achieve better resilience. These solutions were improving 
firewall technology or making sure more of the system is protected by aa security 
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system Some talk again about the use of a detection system, where they have some 
goals to implement it in more parts of the system, or just expand it to cover new 
areas. Another finding was that 4 out of 11 talks about increasing awareness as a goal, 
where they use drills, practices, and recent events to teach and improve awareness 
among employees. Having employees investigate events and being alerted about 
attacks and how they are happening is a strategy that they believe increases the 
employee's ability to avoid human error.   
There is some focus on documentation among our respondents as well. Using 
documentation to provide apparent reasons to the management for why we need to 
do this or acquire that, or why doing it this way is bad. I1 and I5 support using 
documentation to create a more substantial way of reporting different events or 
using it to inform others about what they should know about. This is a similar goal to 
other respondents as well, how to convince the management to perform certain 
actions that can improve the resilience of their organization. 6 out of 11 mentions 
that information about security must be sent up to the management, and make sure 
that they either makes the right decision regarding security, inform them about what 
they must do, or raise awareness among them, as to reduce the likelihood of them 
falling for potential threats, such as phishing.  
4.3.4 Measuring Resilience  
We wanted to ask our respondents about how they know if they are resilient or not, 
and how do they measure this resilience. While some were unsure on how they 
measured whether they were resilient or not, there was some method they agreed 
upon that could indicate some level of resilience.   
One method was the use of testing, 4 out of 11 used various levels of testing to see 
how many employees make mistakes, such as phishing-tests or testing the system 
with a penetration-test to see how well the system handled being attacked. In this 
way we can get some indication of how resilient a system is. Another method that 
was used was logs, I5, I7 and I10 mention viewing logs to see how well a system 
detects events, including “false event” where an employee makes some minor 
mistake, and the system detects and reports it as a threat event. Using logs to see 
how good the system can detect when an error is happening can further help provide 
some measures of resilience in an organization. In addition, I3 specified a certain 
way of measuring resilience of their systems by saying the following: “We have a 
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threshold based on one to six. Where level 6 is the most critical system and 1 being 
the least critical. Having a level 6 system means it has no form for redundancy and 
if that system is out, the whole organization is out of business. Therefore, we tag 
elements based on that and work on it.” When asked if it was possible to see this 
threshold and how it determines if the system is level 1 or 6, the answer was no, this 
information is confidential. However, I10 mentioned a similar threshold level they 
use to measure systems and was able to provide an example shown below that it is 
possible to share with the public eye.  
 
Table 11: Threshold level (provided by a research subject) 
 
 
4.3.5 Resilience Awareness  
Resilience awareness is described by 8 of our respondents as one of the most 
significant factors that contributes to proper security and resilience within the energy 
sector. When asked about how organizations achieve awareness of security and 
resilience, all our respondents mentioned that it is performed through appropriate 
training. I1 mentions awareness is increased through security month and 
implementation of IT security expertise which they have seen work exceptionally. 
They have also created a network of information based on projects, training, and 
previous incidents both internal and external that is available for everyone in the 
organization. The purpose of this network is to help both new and old employees 
gain an understanding of resilience and make them aware. Moreover, I1 specified 
that they have something called subject day, where once a year they get external 
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speakers from NSM and KraftCERT to hold a presentation about security and 
resilience awareness.  
I3 and I5 describe the national security month they have is crucial to increasing 
awareness of their employees. In that month, a lot of information, training, and 
courses were taken about security and resilience. Several of the respondents 
mentioned that people in the energy sector are aware of security and resilience, 
however that was not always the case. To change that they went from having security 
days/months from being focused on health, safety and environment (HSE) to 
including IT security and putting it in context for the individual, whereas everyone is 
involved i.e., from cleaning to CEO. In addition to the security day/month there are 
semi-annual meetings that are held in the operating areas where they include several 
topics and discussions to increase awareness of resilience and the consequences of it 
if something should go wrong. While most of the respondents focused on training 
and how they are performed, I7 described that they do not have any specific way of 
increasing awareness in their organization. They focus on having general training, 
right mindset and attitude which indirectly helps with awareness. I7 explains “We 
make employees aware of resilience through general training that is available for 
both new and existing employees. Some of them might require more sharp and 
extensive training than others, but there is nothing else besides that we do.”  
In addition to training, all the respondents described part of increasing awareness is 
about building a security culture and making sure that the behavior of employees is 
the one required to have in today's IT world. The requirements they mentioned is the 
following:  
● That the people become more competent.  
● Get the training they need.  
● Get involved in various aspects of the organization.  
● Experience that security solutions are continuously updated and 
implemented.  
● Adjust unappropriated solutions and then implement them.  
● Communicate properly both internally and externally.  
  
To further strengthen that security culture, I3 mentions that involving the employees 
in events such as making analysis of small units, then using them to learn and build 
awareness is essential. Along with that they are extremely focused on not playing the 
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blame game. If someone happens to make a mistake they would rather help and train 
that individual. I3 explains “There is incredible value in learning from mistakes. It is 
much better to share information and teach the community (workplace) than trying 
to hide the mistakes.”   
Lastly, several respondents describe resilience awareness as an ongoing process that 
continuously creates new milestones and in general never has a clear stopping point. 
There is always room for improvement, and it is essential to have that type of 
mindset and never think what they have is good enough. 
4.4 Awareness training 
We wanted to know more about what type of training or practices are currently being 
used within the energy sector, how well they work for our respondents and if there 
was something they believed could be done differently to make it better.  
We additionally discussed when and why people ignore security routines and how 
this can be handled within the organization.   
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Figure 14: Training within the energy sector 
4.4.1 Type of training  
When it comes to what type of training is used within the energy sector, there is a 
general form of training that all respondents seem to have. Such as discussion of 
different security subjects, getting taught about rules and routines, and some use 
practices or paper exercise as a method for training. I1, I4, I5 and I10 contribute to 
the security month, as an important event for training employees.   
  
The national security month is a yearly event, where one month (October) is 
dedicated to raising awareness and competence within business and provides better 
everyday security for all.   
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There was discussion about the use of a small drip to continuously inform and train 
employees. 5 out of 11 all agreed about using these small drips to keep their employee 
up to date with security threats, and to keep them aware throughout the year, rather 
than focusing everything on just one month. This training consisted of sending out 
information about relevant treats, courses they could take such as micro e-learning 
or doing phishing testing to get the employee talking and sharing.   
I2, I6 and I8 further talk about having some drills where they look at mistakes made 
and what they can learn from them or having weekly Information sent out to inform 
on different issues that are in topic to keep employees informed and up to date on 
current trends.   
  
While the security month is the main area for when training occurs, several of them 
take some time to undergo some training by themselves as well. Even though no 
specific training stood out among our respondents, there were some that were more 
important at this time than others. Such as awareness of e-mail and phishing attacks, 
and sharing information about recent cyber-attacks events, to create a culture where 
Cybersecurity is discussed more.  
4.4.1.1 Training that may work.  
We wanted to know more on an individual level about which practices that our 
informant preferred, and if there were some practices that they believed were the 
better method for learning about cybersecurity.  
  
5 of our respondents think that having some third-party organization such as NC-
Spectrum, KraftCERT, NordSIS and NSM share their experience, and talk about 
events that have happened. Information video and being part of their exercise is what 
they consider are practices that work to learn both themselves and others around 
them. It is having someone who can explain complex events in a simpler manner to 
people not heavily involved in cybersecurity.    
 I4 and I10 preferred a more hands on exercise, where they can involve themselves 
more in details, about what and how, who should we contact if X happens or what 
happens if Y is attacked.   
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Several respondents mention that training that worked for them also depended on 
what their current role in the organization was, where if they had a more technical 
role, they wanted more technical drills, and others in a more organizational role, 
wanted more organizational drills.   
4.4.1.2 Training that may not work.  
When it came to talking about training that did not work, it was more difficult for our 
respondents to answer, as some could not remember what did not work.  
Making a finding here is also difficult because what works for one does not work for 
another. I1 and I4 were at some level of disagreement where one found a deep dive 
into the subject did not work, while the other was against a general shallow dive, as 
that was too boring and simplified.   
Understanding what type of training work does not is highly dependent on the role of 
the individual, some find short brief exercise pointless, while others struggle with 
more comprehensive exercise.   
4.4.2 Frequency  
As mentioned earlier, training is a big part of making the employees aware of security 
and resilience, we wanted to find out how often this training is carried out. 8 
respondents mentioned that they have something called “security month”, where one 
month a year (October in this case) they have full focus on security and resilience 
within their organization. In that month, the organizations focus on teaching and 
refreshing the employee's mind about security and resilience by going through the 
types of training mentioned earlier in the report. In addition to that one-month 5 out 
of 11 explained there is another training which is either once every quarter or at least 
twice a year that will include things the organization deem important to present and 
inform their employees about when it comes to security. I6 described the following 
when asked about the frequency of training.  
   
   “We run it quarterly, but then we have extra focus throughout October as NordSIS 
and NSM are here to talk about security and resilience. Then we run fairly 
structured training with the most important topics throughout October.”  
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Several other respondents further mentioned that besides the quarterly or the 
security month in October, their organization focuses on having some other small 
training/courses which help with keeping security in mind. Moreover, every time an 
incident happens that might be relevant to the energy sector, that incident is shared 
with the employees to show them what has happened and how it could be avoided.  
  
Every informant was then asked the follow-up question: Do you feel the frequency of 
training you have is satisfactory?  
While all our respondents described the training they had as satisfactory, the 
frequency part could be better. 7 out of 11 respondents mentioned that the training 
they have in October could be cut in half where they have half of it at the 
start/middle of the year and the other half at the end. They explained that there must 
be a balance on how much training and information can be given to employees 
without them getting bored and losing their focus/attention. According to I5, having 
extensive training once a year is too little. The training should happen more often if 
they are going to build it as part of their security culture and having an intensive 
month of security may not be enough. I7 explains that:   
  
  “When it comes to frequency of training, we probably have a potential for 
improvement. In general, the employees are put into security instructions and good 
practice on information security and resilience, but the target based on the type of 
personnel and how often these training are carried out could be better.”   
  
To summarize the training happens at very least twice a year and with extra focus 
during what they call the “security month” where the whole organization is focusing 
on security and resilience. When asked about the frequency of this training, most of 
the respondents mentioned that it should be increased and the security month in 
October should be throughout the year.  
  
4.4.3 Inclusiveness  
As for who in the organization gets included in the training depends on what type of 
training is being carried out. The security month in October is for everyone in the 
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organization and it is mandatory to participate in everything. I5 explains they have 
reports that show who has not completed courses or participated in the training. 
Those employees will then get a notification from the highest level of the 
organization to participate and finish the training. As for other times, the employees 
included will depend on their profession and position. I3 specified that some training 
they have had in the organization did not include the accounting department because 
the training they had was about installing software and patching them, which has 
nothing to do with accounting. However, if they see any need for that department to 
be part of the training, they will be included immediately. I1 explains that while most 
training is mandatory and everyone from the CEO down to the technicians must 
participate, additionally some of the training they do is voluntary where the 
employees could sign up and focus on broadening their knowledge of security and 
resilience.  
The inclusiveness of employees when it comes to training is divided into two parts. 
One is about general security review and the general security level, where it must be 
raised across the entire organization. Then there is more specific training such as:  
  
● Role-specific training.  
● Critical role-specific training.  
● Team-based training.  
● Department based training.  
● Location-based training.  
● Work-related safety training.  
  
I6 states that the energy sector and their organizations are genuinely concerned with 
running training that focuses on education and understanding of security and 
resilience for everyone in the organization regardless of position. The training may 
vary but everyone is included. This way every aspect of the organization and sector 
has the highest possible protection.  
4.4.4 Security procedures  
We asked our respondents two very personal questions, but we believed these 
questions to be important for organizations and companies to be aware of.  
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We wanted to know if they did and/or any within their organization ever neglected or 
did not follow certain security routines.   
While many of our respondents answered differently, there was some agreement on 
why they sometimes did not follow security routines. These could be simplicity vs 
complexity, where if you should do it in a complex manner, but there was a simpler 
method for achieving the same, many said they did the simpler method sometime. Or 
when things are unclear or uncertain, they sometimes skip certain parts to get things 
to finish their objective. According to several of our respondents, when they need to 
do a task quickly, or there is a limited amount of time, the likelihood of them 
ignoring security procedures increases. They agreed that they believed it happens 
with others in the same organization for the same reasons, where people take 
shortcuts, or skip some steps to make the everyday simpler for them.   
Understanding that people sometimes will make mistakes, take shortcuts, or time 
pressure may make people not take security into consideration, is something that all 
organizations need to be aware of.   
It should be noted that our respondents only relaxed with non-vital areas, or areas 
with little to no consequence.   
5.0 Discussion  
The focus of this study was on analyzing security and the resilience of CIS in the 
energy sector. For the resilience part, we focus on what the characteristics of 
resilience are, how it is achieved, what challenges and bottlenecks they face, 
measuring resilience, and how they increased awareness among themselves when it 
comes to resilience. Furthermore, we investigated what type of routines, policies and 
frameworks are practiced when it comes to resilience in the energy sector. In this 
section we will relate the result of the study with the research questions and the 
literature study. To restate this study seeks to answerer these questions.   
  
RQ1 “What are the characteristics of resilient critical infrastructures within the 
energy sector, and how can this be achieved?”  
  
RQ2 “What are the best practices used to achieve resilience within the energy 
sector, and how are they carried out to increase the awareness of their employees?”   
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5.1 Characteristics resilient in critical infrastructure  
The fist questions in this study sought to identify the characteristics of resilience 
within the critical infrastructure, and how resilience can be achieved within the 
energy sector. We presented several aspects of what are used to determine the 
definition of resilience, by analyzing and reviewing existing literature and through 
discussion with the respondents. By measuring the existing understanding of 
resilience with the experiences of people working with resilience, we make an 
understanding of what the characteristics of resilience are within the energy sector.  
  
Understanding the definition of the term resilience can be difficult to define as the 
word “resilience” can be used in many different settings, each sometimes with its 
own characteristics. When it comes to resilience in critical infrastructure, Erik 
Hollnagel (2014, p.376) states, “A system is resilient if it can adjust its functioning 
before, during, or following events (changes, disturbances, and opportunities), and 
thereby sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected 
conditions.” The NAS report (2017, p1) states the following:  
“Resilience is not just about lessening the likelihood that these outages will occur. It 
is also about limiting the consequences and disruptions caused by outages while 
power is out, restoring service rapidly afterwards, and learning from these 
experiences in order to better deal with events in the future.”    
To get an overview of attributes that defines what resilience is, we look at figure 1, the 
umbrella concept by Øien m.fl., (2018), which was used by “forsvarets 
forskningsinstitutt6” (FFI) in 2019 as well. The figure provides 5 different attributes 
that define what resilience is.  
  
1. Understanding risk.  
2. Anticipate/prepare.  
3. Absorb/withstand.  
4. Respond/recover.  
5. Adapt/learn.   
  
 
6 Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
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Most of the existing material used these five attributes in some form or another. 
While many write these attributes differently the core explanation is still the same. 
However, it is worth mentioning that some materials do not include attribute nr one 
as definition of resilience.   
  
When asked about what resilience is and what characterizes resilience, the 
respondents had diverse answers. Some respondents highlighted that one of the 
important characteristics of resilience is having a clear understanding of their 
systems, what it does and what it can encounter. By having this clear understanding, 
they would be able to understand the risks that could affect the system. Moreover, 
how these risks could lead to creating or finding vulnerabilities that could be used to 
threaten the system with a variety of attacks with disastrous consequences. Knowing 
what type of threats and risks exist, and the amount of damage they could cause 
makes it critical to gain an understanding of their system and how they could stay or 
attempt to stay ahead of the curve. The respondents were asked to list what type of 
threats/challenges the energy sector is facing today, and how essential it is for them 
to know about these threats and how to address them. 
Based on our results from the interviews, we have created a table that shows the 
currently most common threats the energy sector faces today. 
 
Table 12: Threats the energy sector faces today, according to the research subjects. 
Nr. Attack/Threat Number of respondents 
1 Ransomware 10 out of 11  
2 Phishing 10 out of 11 
3 System Vulnerabilities in SCADA 9 out of 11 
4 Insider Threat 5 out of 11 
5 State Sponsored  5 out of 11 
6 Hacktivism 5 out of 11 
7 Cyber Espionage 5 out of 11 
8 Traffic monitoring 2 out of 11 
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Comparison of the findings in this study (Table 12) with those of other studies (Table 
3) confirms that understanding of the common threats has changed. Knowledge of 
what threats can occur helps build up a resilience that can handle the more frequent 
attacks. Understanding risk and what may impact the organization is the same as the 
first attribute of what is resilience and leads to the second characteristic of resilience 
preparedness. Taking actions or activities by the energy sector to anticipate the 
threats and challenges they are facing or might face in the future is a big part of being 
resilient. In addition, the respondents mentioned that planning what to do and how 
to implement their goals is another characteristic of being resilient. Through 
planning they can manage to prepare, mitigate attacks, and have a proper response 
when something undesirable happens.   
There is as well a geographical implication on how resilience is understood in 
Norway. Some of our respondents point out that other European countries usually 
have one or more large power plants that cover a large amount of area. While in 
Norway due to the mountainous landscape, there is a decentralization of power 
plants, with many small ones instead. Therefore, if one power plant is attacked and 
cannot function others can take its place. This is similar to attribute nr 3, where the 
ability absorb/withstand plays into effect, by not having a single defined target for 
attackers to focus on.  
  
Other characteristics that all respondents mentioned to be of highest importance 
when it came to being resilient and that is the legislation, framework, and the role 
NVE plays in their respective sector. KBF and NVE seem to be a key characteristic to 
being resilient when it comes to the organizations/ respondents that we interviewed. 
The respondents highlighted that most if not everything the energy sector needs 
when it comes to security and resilience is accomplished by NVE and the assistance 
provided from NSM and KraftCERT.  
 
Looking at the existing literature and what the respondents said about the 
characteristics of resilience, we can see that Norway applies the same resilience 
concept as the umbrella concept (figure 1) with the addition of what the 5 attributes 
that define/characterize resilience in the FFI report. Moreover, as mentioned by Lars 
Gjesvik (2019), NVE has a vital role as a supervisor for the energy sector when it 
comes to their security and resilience. NVE provides services for anything from what 
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type of threats exist, prepare for these threats, and how to protect themselves from it. 
According to the data gathered from the interviews there are some things that are 
different in Norway. The two things that stood out were the type of threats and HRO. 
None of the respondents mentioned anything about HRO and the HRO 5 hallmarks 
during the interviews. When we brought up HRO the respondents stated what they 
knew about it, however it was not used as a way of characterizing or achieving 
resilience in Norway.  
 As for the threats and challenges, if we compare Table 3 of threats/attacks provided 
by ECSO (2018) and Table 12 created based on the data gathered from the 
interviews, we can see that some of the threats have higher priority in Norway than 
other countries. According to our respondents, Norway has higher priorities on 
increasing awareness among employees. This is in accordance with what our 
respondents believed to be the biggest threats, such as ransomware and phishing, 
both are types of attacks that use employees to harm the organization. These 
priorities may look different from other countries which are more focused on dealing 
with threats such as malware and DDoS as shown in the ECSO (2018) table 3.   
5.2 Achieving resilience in critical infrastructure.   
There are several methods used to achieve resilience. Figure 2 illustrates how the 
NAS in the USA achieve a resilient system with four different steps. Prepare -> 
Ameliorate -> Quickly Recover -> Observe, Learn, and improve. (NAS, 2017: p,1) The 
last step loops back through the three first steps, and according to NAS following this 
method will help achieve a resilient system. This is similar to umbrella concept 
(Figure 1) where the same principles are to be prepared, be able to absorb the attack, 
and then recover and learn what went wrong, what worked and how to improve.  
One of the challenges when using a framework is how easily or how well an 
organization can follow such a method. How does one prepare or how do one 
mitigate attacks? There are many frameworks that provide supposed solutions and 
methods to follow for achieving resilience. NIST or ISO standards are often 
mentioned in international areas, where large organizations can use these standards 
as intended. While other nations such as Norway, with smaller organization and less 
capacity create their own versions that they believe is better suited for them, such as 
KBF. 
   
 
  82 of 111 
 
From the discussing about how our respondents achieve resilience in their 
organization one of the most common answers was that they followed KBF, and that 
it was a helpful guide in how to manage cybersecurity. Another quite persistent factor 
was communication with other parties, NVE, NSM, kraftCERT, KraftSIS etc., to help 
inform them about threats and what attacks happening, share knowledge and share 
competence. Where some had people come over to their organization to teach them 
or help them solve certain problems. Having a network with other organizations to 
provide some level of assistance seemed to be a characteristic for our respondents. In 
addition, the energy sector in Norway aims to achieving resilience through 
organizational and technical level, by having several methods for both of them. When 
it comes to the organizational part, the energy sector focuses on having proper 
policies, training, and routines which helps create a mindset of always being 
prepared and knowing what to do in different situations. As for the technical level, 
the energy sector is occupied with having the correct tools to both protect themselves 
and achieve resilience. There are several measurements taken to achieve resilience 
on the technical level. The systems used are usually inspected layer by layer to make 
sure that everything is optimal. Everything in their system is backed up, encrypted, 
and protected by their IDS. A balance created between security accessibility, 
usability, and resilience. Lastly, having an overview of the system and knowing where 
their weakest points are and patching them is an important way of achieving 
resilience in the energy sector as well.  
  
When comparing existing literature with what our interviews, we see the expected 
similarities, where using the KBF is a valuable tool for our respondents, to help 
provide some guidelines on how they assemble literature. The same can be said for 
the use of third-party organizations to provide early warning, and information about 
threats, that can help with preparing for attacks. Additionally, there was a similarity 
between the way the energy sector and the RMI achieve resilience, where several 
methods mentioned by RMI are implemented in the energy sector. 
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5.3 What are considered the “best” practices to achieve 
resilience.  
There are several practices that can help achieve resilience, implementing a 
framework or legislation known as “best” practice can be immensely helpful for 
organizations. In the international area, there are several frameworks that can 
provide this “best” method of achieving resilience. The literature study revealed 
several referrals to NIST and the ISO standards, and they are considered best-
practice guidelines.  
“Prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach to 
manage cybersecurity risk for those processes, information, and systems directly 
involved in the delivery of critical infrastructure services.” (Sedgewick, 2014 pg. 3)  
When working with Cybersecurity, it is highly recommended to follow these 
standards, however, there have been some issues with scalability of the frameworks, 
especially for smaller organizations. In Norway there are other 
frameworks/legislation used, such as KBF which are still based on the NIST and the 
ISO but created to fit in areas where NIST or ISO are too large and too 
comprehensive to be effectively used. Nevertheless, having and using these 
frameworks are particularly important.  
“The framework enables organizations - regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity 
risk, or cybersecurity sophistication - to apply the principles and best practices of 
risk management to improving the security and resilience.” (Barrett, 2018, p v).  
  
While having and using frameworks is a vital practice there are other practices that 
are more specific to how to achieve resilience. When analyzing existing material 
several specific topics emerged. One of these was e-mail filtering that helped prevent 
phishing. Social engineering attacks are quite common, and all it takes is one 
unconscious employee to achieve some effect. phishing attacks take advantage of 
what is often considered the weakest part of the system, the people. Therefore, it was 
expected that practices helping prevent or mitigate social engineering are among the 
essential practices.  
Another “best” practice, was monitoring the system, where tools such as DLP, and 
SIEM were controlling the information, and monitoring for abnormality and 
reporting if any are detected. Having control of the information and making sure it 
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stays safe when it enters, or leaves is a practice that helps mitigate potential security 
issues.  
  
According to our respondents there are several practices implemented in their 
respected sector that are considered “best”. Policies, routines and creating a culture 
within the organization that aims at having the best security possible and being 
resilient is one of the practices mentioned multiple times during the interviews. The 
way to achieve resilience according to our respondents is by following KBF as much 
as possible. In addition, they use other practices, such as collaborating with third 
parties that would assist their organization in maintaining proper security and 
resilience by sharing expertise, giving notification, and showing them how to respond 
or recover from certain situations. Documentation and logging are used quite often 
and according to our informant they are both highly effective and efficient. 
Documentation and logging are used in the following ways to achieve resilience:  
● Report on events/incidents.  
● Inform others on how and what to do.  
● Provide sufficient evidence/reasons for why a certain practice needs to be 
implemented.  
● Assists with reducing the likelihood of being victim to attacks.  
● Convince management of making the right decision.  
● Raise awareness among the organization about security and resilience.  
  
Raising awareness is a practice itself in the energy sector, in addition to be part of 
documentation. The respondents explain that increasing awareness within the 
organization is a practice and a goal that they want to achieve implementing and 
continuously improving.  
Other practices that were mentioned were knowing what type of technical solutions 
should be implemented to achieve better resilience. Some respondents described, 
implementing, and improving firewall technology (if possible), and adding IDS in 
more areas helps with expanding their resilience and security, which could be 
considered as “best” practice for them. In addition to adding these solutions, it was 
mentioned that testing and measuring the systems are one of the practices they carry 
out to achieve better resilience. The energy sector uses penetration tests to measure 
the resilience and the endurance of the system. Moreover, they keep logs which are 
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continuously monitored for how well their system detects and reports events as 
threats, including false ones. There are more practices to achieve resilience used in 
the energy sector today than what is covered in this thesis, however those were either 
not mentioned or be described due to confidentiality.  
  
There are several similarities between the existing literature and what our 
respondents have shared with us. Using framework or legislation were an essential 
key factor in both cases, and our respondents credited KBF for being one of the 
“best” ways to ensure security and resilience within their organization.  
While frameworks were a big aspect of security, they were not the only once. Several 
of our respondents talked about system monitoring, such as having IDS or focusing 
on implementing firewalls.  
One challenge that may be difficult to reflect on is what are the specific “best” 
method for employees between existing literature and what our respondents have 
said. This is because we were able to dig deeper into how and why with our 
respondents and get personal experience from them. However, with existing 
litterateur, most was a more general approach to employees. Lastly, based on what 
the respondents have said about practices used in their organization, we can see that 
the energy sector is implementing the aspects of figure 6 as best practices.  
5.4 How awareness is increased among employees.   
During the literature review we discovered that information on awareness has mostly 
focused on a more general view.  
Therefore, our understanding of the specifics on how awareness is increased among 
existing literature is limited.  
  
Throughout the literature review it was discovered that having an organization or 
analytical team that worked on teaching employees about security, helping them 
understand and identifying the existing threats, and how to keep their data secure 
from attacks such as phishing or ransomware, was one of the methods in rising 
awareness of the employee. Practicing an incident response plan to train employees 
to know what to do when an unexpected event happens, was a high priority as well. 
Most information about increasing awareness was primarily targeting social 
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engineering threats, this may be because of how employees are targeted by these 
kinds of threats.  
Training, informing, and having a response plan are some of the main attributes of 
how awareness is taught to employees. However specific details of the training and 
response plan were not investigated.  
  
In the interviews we discussed with our respondents how the practices implemented 
in the energy sector contribute to raising awareness. It was mentioned that they help 
the employees understand why things are carried out in a certain way, i.e., 
documentation helps the organization understand more things about themselves and 
make the employees aware of where they might improve. In addition, when it comes 
to providing or increasing resilience, most decisions are made by the management, 
and one practice is to provide evidence or reasoning for why certain measurements 
must be taken. Through reasoning provided by documentation, reports or 
presentation (depending on who is for) employees from the bottom organization all 
the way to management can be informed of resilience and the importance of it.  
Regarding third parties, several respondents mentioned that having third parties 
with their expertise and knowledge where they are sharing data, warning them of 
new threats and risks, point to new incidents, and respond to threats or attacks is 
essential for the energy sector. Moreover, the combination of third parties and KBF 
assists the energy sector with creating a desired security culture within the 
organization where they focus on being as resilient as possible. Training was another 
practice mentioned in the findings when it came to increasing awareness. The energy 
sector has training at certain times of the year, and some are more frequent than 
others. These training courses show the employees what is important when it comes 
to resilience, how resilience is achieved. Training further shows them certain 
scenarios on how things can go terribly wrong if the employees are not aware of 
resilience or are not following certain policies, routines, guidelines, or tools provided 
for them. In addition, these training courses are performed throughout the year so 
that employees are reminded of the importance of their job and how to maintain and 
protect the resilience achieved within the organization. The practices are carried out 
in many ways to reach everyone in the organization. The energy sector knows that 
people learn in different ways, therefore these practices have a variety of methods to 
teach about resilience, it could be anything from videos, quizzes, team-based games, 
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VR, and more. This is performed so that the training can reach and affect the entire 
organization.  
These practices are performed so that organizations in the energy sector can have the 
ability to investigate events or incidents, be alerted, how it happened, and how to 
respond if they were the victim of these incidents. 
Furthermore, the practices help them with understanding what is out there and 
avoid or prevent mistakes or attacks that might occur.  
 
Increasing the awareness of employees can be a challenge, because of how different 
people respond to teaching and learning. Looking at the existing literature and 
discussing with our respondents, we understand that there is no single best practice 
that can cover everything. Organization must be flexible in training personnel based 
on their role and experience. Our findings did discover that certain practices are 
more effective than others, such as getting small nuggets of information to help 
understand what is happening around them, how this can affect them, and what they 
can do to avoid it. Engaging the employee with scenarios where they are free to fail 
without consequences and giving them the chance to trial and error can make the 
employees feel more comfortable learning about resilience and increasing their 
awareness. 
6.0 Contribution and suggestion for further 
research  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the resilience of CIS within the energy 
sector and how they increased the awareness of resilience within their respected 
sector. This study was established after we had a term project that focused on 
frameworks and security within the energy sector and decided to look upon resilience 
for our master thesis. We started by organizing a literature review to gain an 
understanding of what type of literature exists about the risks, threats, challenges, 
security, and resilience of the energy sector and then prepare for the qualitative 
approach. The empirical data we collected was thematically analyzed and categorized 
based on the structure of the literature review and one we used in the interviews, 
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which consisted of 11 qualitative semi-structured interviews. This was then used to 
answer our research question with the addition of the existing literature.  
6.1 Summary of Related Research  
The mapping of the study for this thesis has resulted in 34 papers. The review starts 
by briefly explaining what CIS is and the importance of it. Then it aims at the risks, 
threats, and challenges the energy sector is dealing with. To deal with these 
challenges the review provides various practices/methods to address them and 
increase the security, resilience, and the awareness of the respected sector.  
  
This led to identifying what resilience is and are the attributes that can be used to 
define it. And how do the employees learn or become more resilient Secondly, we 
investigate what constitutes best practices, and if there are any explanations of why 
these are considered best practices. Finally, we investigated different frameworks 
that potentially could improve or impact resilience in some way.   
6.2 Summary of Empirical Findings  
The empirical findings identified 8 types of threats/attacks that our respondents 
were most concerned about. The energy sector is guided by NVE on how to deal with 
existing and upcoming threats through various methods/practices. One of them is 
the legislation called KBF which is specifically made for them on how to build and 
maintain a desired level of resilience. In addition to KBF, the findings show that the 
energy sector achieves resilience through implementing policies, training, proper 
tools, sharing knowledge with others, and including everyone. These are carried out 
frequently to keep the mindset of the employees and the sector focused on always 
achieving the best resilience possible.   
6.3 Contribution to Theory  
Resilience - The term resilience is a system that can adjust its functioning before, 
during, or following events and thereby continue operating under both expected and 
unexpected conditions as said by Eirik Hollnagel. Following this as well as other 
definitions we discovered several key characteristics that can define resilience.  
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We identified four common attributes from most of the existing literature, these were 
Anticipate/prepare, Absorb/withstand, Respond/recover, and Adapt/learn.   
These attributes represent the core of what a resilient system is.  
However, we discovered a fifth attribute from Øien m.fl., (2018) which added 
Understanding risk as the first step, this was an attribute that was confirmed by 
several of our respondents to be a major step in making the system resilient. Adding 
this attribute as a core to what a resilient system is helps emphasize the importance 
of being updated on risk and threats that are continuously changing.  
  
Identifying threats - The energy sector is susceptible to several threats such as 
equipment failure, software, human error, and insider attack, which does make it 
difficult to operate, secure and ensure that the system is robust (Kyriakides & 
Polycarpou, 2014). Moreover, other threats have emerged and focus on harming the 
energy sector through cyberattacks, which can harm systems to the point of shutting 
them down or even give full remote access to the attacker. As mentioned, ECSO 
findings in 2018 presented a table (table 3) of most common threats that the energy 
sector encounters and how some of them have higher probability than others. After 
the analysis of the findings, we identified that the threats in the Norwegian energy 
sector differ from the ECSO-findings in 2018.  
 
Table 13: Threat comparison 
Nr. Attack/Threat 
ECSO 2018  
Attack/Threat 
Study 2021  
1 Malware Ransomware 
2 DDOS Phishing 
3 Cyber Espionage System Vulnerabilities in SCADA 
4 Web-based Attacks Insider Threat 
5 Insider Threat State Sponsored  
6 Hacktivism Hacktivism 
7 Malicious Code Cyber Espionage 
8 Phishing Traffic monitoring 
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The differentiation lies with the probability of the threats happening and which ones 
concern them the most. These newly identified threats lay the grounds for carrying 
out a quantitative study to further understand how threats change over time and 
their relevance.   
  
NIST framework - When it came to framework, one of the most common talked 
frameworks that existed for organizations to use was NIST framework. This 
framework is considered best-practice and supposedly can work for any organization 
regardless of size.   
“The framework enables organizations - regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity 
risk, or cybersecurity sophistication - to apply the principles and best practices of 
risk management to improving the security and resilience of critical 
infrastructure.” (Barrett 2018)   
While in theory this might be true, in practice it is quite different as we discovered. 
Frameworks such as NIST are not practiced in Norway due to several reasons. KBF, 
which is tailored for the energy sector, is an incredibly strict framework/legislation 
for ICT security and resilience and they do not see the need for implementing 
something else. Additionally, we identified that some organizations in the energy 
sector lack desired knowledge and control in areas such as asset management and 
governance shown in Table 6 of the NIST framework, therefore it makes it more 
difficult to introduce/implement it. The NIST framework is very Americanized and 
compared to the KBF and other frameworks implemented, NIST seems to be very 
extensive, and difficult to operate without having a certification. Due to these reasons 
NIST framework, among other heavy frameworks, are too complicated for many if 
not all organizations in Norwegian energy sector to follow even though these 
frameworks claim to be the best-practice and can be implemented for any 
organization regardless of size.  
6.4 Implications for Practitioners  
The gathered results from the interview and literature review show that the 
awareness of what characterizes resilience, and how the energy sector achieves it is at 
a satisfactory level. We have found that many of the employees have a good 
relationship and knowledge of resilience and what their organizations are doing to 
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maintain that type of resilience. These organizations find it important to implement 
ways for practitioners to understand the importance of security and resilience within 
their given sector and that it should always be kept in mind. However, it was further 
mentioned that the energy sector is aiming to increase that awareness even more. By 
increasing the awareness, the organizations within the energy sector would be able to 
help every practitioner understand the importance of resilience from the top all the 
way to the bottom, creating an environment where not only some people are aware of 
resilience but rather all. With that being said, the results showed that the awareness 
of resilience is not quite clarified on every level of the organization as well. Even 
though the energy sector might be aiming to improve that, at this very moment it is 
not where it should be. If every practitioner is familiar with term resilience and how 
it could be achieved, it might reduce the impact of existing threats today.   
6.5 Limitations and Implication for Further Research  
This study was a qualitative study that used lengthy interviews to conduct research. 
To this end we wanted to achieve 15 interviews, with different organizations within 
the energy sector of Norway. However, we encountered some limitations with 
acquiring people to interview, for varied reasons, such as many did not have time, for 
this type of interview, some believed they were unqualified to answer, and declined. 
While COVID-19 was not a direct issue for us, as our interviews were planned to do 
virtually, it may have unforeseen complications for people we wanted to interview, 
which made them unavailable for interview.   
Because of this we reached 11 interviews, which we believed to be acceptable, but 
having more interviews with more organizations may have led to more discovery or 
reinforced this study even further.   
As for further research, we found the subject of how security and resilience is 
implemented, and how frameworks play a part, to be something that can be 
investigated a broader area, with other sector to see how many need to create their or 
own version of framework, to act as guideline when raising awareness or increasing 
security. Furthermore, an extensive study that includes more actors, other 
stakeholders, and more respondents that have the knowledge and expertise of 
resilience would be interesting to conduct.    
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6.6 Conclusion  
The goal of this study was divided into two factors. First was to investigate the RQ1 
question, of the energy sector's understanding of resilience; what resilience is, what 
defines a resilient system, and how one can achieve resilience. To answer this 
question, we investigated different existing literature to see if there were some 
common features that could be considered as a definition. From there we could 
compare our data to see whether there were some differences from the literature. The 
challenge was to analyze what was said by our respondents and determine whether it 
matched our research without some level of bias, or by overestimating what was 
being said by our respondents. To best meet these challenges, we broke down each 
informant's data, and used the literature research as the basis for measuring, from 
there it simplified the process of analyzing the data. And based on this we were able 
to provide some findings to RQ1, where based on our respondents which represent 
seven different organizations, there was a greater understanding of what resilience is, 
many of them described the key attribute of resilience found in the literature 
research. Some respondents consider resilience as something that is for the entire 
organization, and only when everything is taken into consideration, can they know if 
what they have is resilient or not. In addition, just as the threat actors will 
continuously attempt to find new ways to breach systems, the energy sector should as 
well find new ways to achieve better security and resilience. While some had more 
understanding of what the term meant, and how it related to their sector, there were 
significant deviation was discovered from the literature research and the 
respondents.  
However, differences exist such as the existence of HRO and that it was not 
mentioned by our informant, most of these differences are either not fully 
investigated by our side, or we believed the quantity of respondents were too few, to 
provide adequate data.  
  
After looking into resilience and what it is, we were prepared to move into the second 
part of this study, and answer RQ2. For this part we need to understand what is 
considered best practice, how well they work, and how they can be used to increase 
the awareness of their employees. As same as RQ1 we investigated what was defined 
as best-practices and tried to find ways to determine if they worked.  
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The challenge here is that there are a few big companies that provide the best 
practices such as NIST or ISO, and there are many smaller companies that also 
provide some best practices, but many references back to NIST or ISO. Therefore, 
comparing existing literature with other sources to see if certain practices stood out 
became difficult. We proceeded therefore to use these best practices to compare them 
with our respondents in the energy sector. Based on our literature research and from 
information from our informant we knew that much of the best-practice framework 
was based on ISO, and NIST. However, we further discover that these best-practices 
as they are represented where to large or complex for the energy sector in Norway, 
this meant that the best-practices that ISO and NIST used, was not viable in this 
area, instead they use other framework or legislation that they consider best-
practices such as KBF. They had to adapt ISO and NIST standards into something 
that was more specialized for their needs. This leads to the speculation that only 
large organizations can use the existing best-practices, while smaller organizations 
must instead create their own standards, that only use some part of best-practices to 
achieve resilience. The same can be said about how they are carried out to increase 
awareness among employees. For most of our respondents they use the security 
month to raise awareness, but some additionally has more focus and having small 
test or provide information throughout the year, and when discussion this aspect 
with informant that mostly followed the one-month standard, several of them did 
wish they also had some more awareness training that was not confined to the 
cybersecurity month. An unexpected finding in this area was the level of intertwining 
in the networks between our respondents and the third parties. which were 
connected through sharing of information and people to help raise the overall 
resilience of the energy sector. 
  
As a final summary of our conclusion, we have provided characteristics of what 
resilient critical infrastructures within the energy sector are and found that they are 
similar to what was discovered among our respondents. Understanding this 
characteristic can provide further measurements and guidelines to help 
organizations to achieve knowledge of whether they are resilient or what they need to 
investigate to become more resilient.  
As for best-practices there is a gap between what is defined as best-practices in the 
literature research, and what is defined as best-practices in the energy sector in 
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Norway. This could imply that NIST and ISO standards are limited to size, where 
smaller organizations can base some practices on their standards, they may not be 
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Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
 
Section 1: General information about the interviewee  
1. Position role in the organization, work experience in the organization  
2. What do you work with daily?  
3. Have you participated in any relevant security, framework, or resilience 
projects?  
4. What was the goal of the project?  
5. Did you have any challenges?  
  
Section 2: Security  
6. What type of threats & challenges are critical infrastructures facing today 
(energy sector)?  
7. What do you consider to be the biggest challenges related to security in 
CIS?  
8. How are these security challenges & threats addressed in CIS?  
9. Can you explain the necessary measurements taken to main/increase 
security of CIS both on organizational and technical level?  
10. From all the measurements implemented, what do you experience has 
assisted CIS in maintaining/increasing their security the most?  
  
Section 3: Framework/legislation  
11. Are there any frameworks/legislations you are implementing when it 
comes to security/resilience in CIS?  
12. What does the given framework address when and how?  
13. Have you heard of the NIST framework and is it being used in your type of 
organization?  
14. How come no other frameworks are implemented? Especially the most 
known one such as NIST?  
15. What do you think needs to change for you to implement other known 
frameworks such as NIST?  
16. Do you feel that the framework/ policies could be implemented 
differently? If so, how?  
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Section 4: Resilience  
17. How would you describe resilience in your given sector?   
18. How do you achieve resilience in your given sector both on organizational 
level and technical?  
19. Which parameters do you use to measure resilience/ progress?  
20. What type of strategies and goals do you have/use to increase the security 
and resilience of CIS/energy sector?  
21. How do you increase the awareness of employees of resilience?  
22. What training is performed when it comes to security and resilience?  
23. How often does your organization conduct training?  
24. What do you consider the biggest challenges related to resilience?  
25. Do you have other potential challenges that you experience as a bottleneck 
when it comes to resilience?  
Section 5: Practices   
26. Are these training performed for CERT teams or for the organization as 
whole?  
27. What security training or practice has worked for you?  
28. What security training or practice has not worked for you?  
29. Do you sometimes not follow certain security practices, if yes why?  
30. Do you think others in your organization do not follow certain security 
practices? If yes, why?   
Section 6: Closing-up  
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Appendix 3 Interview Guide 
Thank you for participating in this interview with us. The purpose of this interview is to 
investigate resilience in the energy sector, practices used to achieve it, and how this is 
carried out to increase awareness of the employees. And to potentially discover what 
works, what does not work and potential best practices. 
 
This interview is anonymous, we will NOT write any personal information about our 
interviewee, any personal information record will not be transcribed or added in the 
document and all recordings will be deleted at the end of the master delivery, estimated 
date: 10.06.2021. The interviewee stands free to refuse to answer a question without 
given reason for it. The interviewee understand that this interview and information 
gathered from it, will be used in the master thesis “Resilience & security in critical 
infrastructure within the energy sector” and gives consent for the students of UiA under 
the Master: cyber security: Eirik Andre Stålesen & Shiwan Hassan, to use the interview 
and record in their master thesis. 
 
The interview will ask questions about how the employee has experienced security 
practices, if they have some understanding of resilience, and how this impacts their 
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organization and how well certain practices work for the employee. The estimated time 
for this interview is 45 minutes. 
 
Section 1: General information about the interviewee  
2. Position role in the organization, work experience in the organization  
3. What do you work with daily?  
4. Have you participated in any relevant security, framework, or resilience 
projects?  
5. What was the goal of the project?  
6. Did you have any challenges?  
  
Section 2: Security  
7. What type of threats & challenges are critical infrastructures facing today 
(energy sector)?  
8. What do you consider to be the biggest challenges related to security in 
CIS?  
9. How are these security challenges & threats addressed in CIS?  
10. Can you explain the necessary measurements taken to main/increase 
security of CIS both on organizational and technical level?  
11. From all the measurements implemented, what do you experience has 
assisted CIS in maintaining/increasing their security the most?  
  
Section 3: Framework/legislation  
12. Are there any frameworks/legislations you are implementing when it 
comes to security/resilience in CIS?  
13. What does the given framework address when and how?  
14. Have you heard of the NIST framework and is it being used in your type of 
organization?  
15. How come no other frameworks are implemented? Especially the most 
known one such as NIST?  
16. What do you think needs to change for you to implement other known 
frameworks such as NIST?  
17. Do you feel that the framework/ policies could be implemented 
differently? If so, how?  
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Section 4: Resilience  
18. How would you describe resilience in your given sector?   
19. How do you achieve resilience in your given sector both on organizational 
level and technical?  
20. Which parameters do you use to measure resilience/ progress?  
21. What type of strategies and goals do you have/use to increase the security 
and resilience of CIS/energy sector?  
22. How do you increase the awareness of employees of resilience?  
23. What training is performed when it comes to security and resilience?  
24. How often does your organization conduct training?  
25. What do you consider the biggest challenges related to resilience?  
26. Do you have other potential challenges that you experience as a bottleneck 
when it comes to resilience?  
Section 5: Practices   
27. Are these training performed for CERT teams or for the organization as 
whole?  
28. What security training or practice has worked for you?  
29. What security training or practice has not worked for you?  
30. Do you sometimes not follow certain security practices, if yes why?  
31. Do you think others in your organization do not follow certain security 
practices? If yes, why?   
Section 6: Closing-up  
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Appendix 4 Consent Form 
 
Vil du delta i forskningsprosjektet 
 
” Sikkerhet og resiliens i kritisk infrastruktur innenfor energi sektor.” 
 
Dette er et spørsmål til deg om å delta i et forskningsprosjekt hvor formålet er å avdekke 
sikkerhet og resilience knyttet til kritisk infrastruktur. I dette skrivet gir vi deg 




Vi ønsker å se hva sikkerhet og resiliens betyr for organiasjoner som har kritisk 
infrastruktur systemer og eventuelt hvordan oppnår de ønsket nivå av resiliens? Vi 
fokuserer på å forstå hva resiliens er i energi sektor, hvordan de oppnår det og hvilken 
best practises blir brukt innen for angitt sektor i Norge. Hensikten er om å avdekke om 
resiliens betyr det samme for forkjellige infrastrukturer i samme land eller andre, hva 
som gjøres for å beskytte sikkerheten til en kritisk infrastruktur og hvordan oppnår de 
det. 
 
Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet? 
Universitet i Agder er ansvarlig for prosjektet, i samarbeid med NC Spectrum. 
 
Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta? 
Studiet ble trukket gjennom samarbeid med NC Spectrum og instituttets og veileders 
nettverk, samt aktører som vi anser som relevant innen for kritisk infrastruktur og 
energi sektor. 
Kontakt opplysningene kan være innhentet gjennom NC-Spectrum eller Universitet i 
Agder. 
 
Hva innebærer det for deg å delta? 
 
Hvis du velger å delta i prosjektet, innebærer det å svare på spørsmål stilt i intervjuer. 
Vi samler inn navn, epost eller telefonnummer i tilfelle det inngår kontaktinformasjon. 
Vi skal også ha lydopptak som transkriberes. Bakgrunnsopplysninger som vil kunne 
identifisere en person vil bli slettet og anonymiseres før publisering. 
 
Det er frivillig å delta 
Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke 
samtykket tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle dine personopplysninger vil da bli 
slettet. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller 
senere velger å trekke deg.  
 
Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger  
Vi vil bare bruke opplysningene om deg til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Vi 
behandler opplysningene konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket. 
 
   
 
  108 of 111 
 
• Prosjektgruppe som består av to masterstudenter, samt veileder ved Universitet 
i Agder vil ha tilgang til opplysningene vi samler inn, før de anonymiseres. 
 
• Vi vil unngå personlig informasjon av deltakerne, slik at vi ikke lagrer navn og 
kontaktopplysninger av deltakerne, alt av informasjon som blir tatt opp 
lydopptaket vil lagres på instituttets godkjente datalagringstjeneste: OneDrive. 
Hvis navn eller kontakt opplysninger blir tatt opp i lydfil, vil de ikke ble 
transkribert, og slettet ved slutten av prosjektet. 
 
Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet? 
Opplysningene anonymiseres når prosjektet avsluttes/oppgaven er godkjent, noe som 
etter planen er  
 
10.06.2020. Ved prosjektslutt destrueres opptak og lagrede personlige data, og gjengis 
kun i anonymisert form. 
 
Dine rettigheter 
Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til: 
- innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg, og å få utlevert en 
kopi av opplysningene, 
- å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,  
- å få slettet personopplysninger om deg, og 
- å sende klage til Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger. 
 
Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg? 
Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke. 
 
På oppdrag fra Universitet i Agder har NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS 
vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med 
personvernregelverket. 
 
Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer? 
Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta 
kontakt med: 
 
• Devendra Bahadur Thapa ved Universitetet i Agder, veileder for masteroppgaven 
(+47 952 56 430, devinder.thapa@uia.no) 
 
• Vårt personvernombud: Ina Danielsen (+47 381 42 140 ina.danielsen@uia.no). 
 
Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til NSD sin vurdering av prosjektet, kan du ta kontakt med:  
• NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS på epost 
(personverntjenester@nsd.no) eller på telefon: 55 58 21 17. 
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Prosjektansvarlig    Studenter 
(Veileder)                                                      Eirik Andre Stålesen eirias16@uia.no 






Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet: Motstandskraft og sikkerhet i 
kritisk infrastruktur innen energisektoren, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg 
samtykker til: 
 
 å delta i intervju  
 





(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato) 
 
 
 
